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Brands and Corporate Power 
 
Abstract 
This article argues that brands, with trade marks as their legal anchors, are important 
sources of corporate power and have facilitated a significant expansion of this power. Trade 
mark law has contributed to the development of firms and to the rise of powerful business 
actors that rely on strong marketing presences based on brands to attract demand, but use 
flexible supply chains to meet this demand. This article considers the relationship between 
trade marks and brands and the kinds of corporate power to which brands can contribute. 
It shows how brands have enabled some firms to transform their activities in response to 
changing economic and social conditions and even to transform themselves as business 
actors. Whilst trade mark law provides some mitigation of the power that brands can 
confer, it can still be substantial and to some extent of questionable social value. 
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Brands and Corporate Power* 
 
1. Introduction 
Large firms affect our lives in many ways. When we think of them, we are likely to think of 
their trading names, brand names, logos and other signifiers. We are less likely to think of 
specific corporate names or their legal natures and structures. Trading names and logos 
give these firms a presence in our minds and can make them seem more real. They enable 
what may be complex and changing legal structures to manifest themselves as relatively 
simple entities with distinctive personalities. They are also valuable corporate assets and, 
as this article will seek to demonstrate, important sources of corporate power. 
                                                          
* Andrew Griffiths, Professor of Law, Newcastle University. 
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This article will argue that the ability of companies and other business actors 
(hereafter “firms”)1 to secure exclusive rights over names and other signifiers through 
registering them as trade marks enables these firms to gain and exploit significant power.2 
In part, this is because the firms can use these signifiers to present relatively simple, 
cohesive and stable identities to the outside world that can mask their complexity as legal 
structures and their tendency to change and evolve. It is also because firms can use their 
signifiers to establish brands for the goods or services (“products”) from which they earn 
their profits and to turn them into specific objects of demand. Firms can then use these 
same signifiers as communication devices to engage in marketing activity to solicit and 
attract demand specifically to their branded products and to ensure that this demand 
(“specific demand”) is directed and reeled in to these products. A firm’s success at attracting 
and securing specific demand for its branded products can give it not only significant 
market power, but also bargaining power with other parties in the value chains in which it 
operates. It can even give the firm strategic power, enabling it to transform itself as an 
organisation to respond to changes in the business environment and to seize new 
opportunities for exploiting its market power.  
This article will relate the potential advantages that firms can gain from the 
ownership of trade marks to the forms of corporate power that John Parkinson identified in 
his seminal book on Corporate Power and Responsibility.3 The availability of this resource 
has influenced the evolution of firms, the structuring of value chains and the balance of 
power within these chains.4 The contribution of trade marks to corporate power is therefore 
a dynamic one that can enable firms to transform themselves in order to gain greater power 
or to exploit their power more effectively. Apple Inc. provides a good example of this 
                                                          
1 Trade mark law uses the term “undertaking” to refer to business actors. This term includes a company or any 
other entity or organisation that can operate as a cohesive unit in relation to the use of the trade mark: Case C-
9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38]-[39]. It may therefore cover a complex business 
organisation consisting of a number of separate legal persons such as a group of companies as long as they are 
subject to a single point of ultimate control: Case C-520/09 Arkema v European Commission [2011] ECR I-
8901 [37]. This article will use the term “firm” to refer to an undertaking in this broad sense unless the context 
requires otherwise.  
2 In the European Union, Directive 89/104/EEC (amended and codified as Directive 2008/95/EC) (“the 
Directive”) has substantially harmonised the law governing registered trade marks. The Trade Marks Act 1994 
(“the 1994 Act”) implemented the Directive in the United Kingdom. The Council of the EU published a revised 
Directive in December 2015 (“the 2015 Directive”), which member states are required to implement over the 
following three years. The 2015 Directive has not significantly altered the law relevant to the issues addressed in 
this article. Trade marks may also enjoy some legal protection under national laws that does not depend on 
registration. In the United Kingdom, this is available under the tort of passing off. 
3 J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (The Clarendon Press, 1993) at 8-21. 
4 On the importance of brand-based marketing to the development of firms, see, for example, M. Wilkins, “The 
Neglected Intangible Asset: The Influence of the Trade Mark on the Rise of the Modern Corporation”, (1992) 
34 Business History 66-95; S. Kim, “The Rise of Multiunit Firms in U.S. Manufacturing”, (1999) 36 
Explorations in Economic History 360-386; R. Church and A. Godley, “The Emergence of Modern Marketing: 
International Dimensions”, (2003) 45 Business History 1-5; T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, 
“Entrepreneurship and the Development of Global Brands”, (2007) 81 Business History Review 651-680; T. da 
Silva Lopes and P. Guimaraes, “Trademarks and British Dominance in Consumer Goods, 1876-1914”, (2014) 
67 Economic History Review 793-817. 
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contribution.5 This firm has used the brand name “Apple” along with various product 
brands to establish a strong marketing presence and to gain substantial market power in 
its dealings with consumers. This branding has given a distinctive and personable identity 
to a complex group of corporate entities based in California.  Apple’s brand name and other 
signifiers and those of its main product brands have become familiar and widely recognised 
presences on the market and Apple has earned record profits from its success at attracting 
and reeling in specific demand to these brands.6 The brand-valuation organisation 
Interbrand ranked Apple as by far the most valuable global brand in 2016, estimating the 
value of this intangible resource at over $170 billion based on factors such as its power to 
attract specific demand and to command premium prices for its products on a global scale.7 
Apple, like many other firms in this position, has been able to use its strong marketing 
presence and the market power associated with this to focus its core capabilities on higher 
value activities such as marketing and product design and development, to outsource much 
of the production of the products sold under its brands into trans-Pacific supply chains and 
to exercise strategic power over these supply chains.8 
The classification of trade mark law as a branch of intellectual property law has 
tended to mask the contribution that trade marks and the brands they signify have made to 
the structuring and restructuring of firms and of the value chains in which they operate 
and to the ability of firms to gain and exploit significant power.9 Even within trade mark 
law, the main emphasis has been on their role in enabling firms to attract specific demand 
                                                          
5 Apple was founded in 1976, incorporated in the State of California as Apple Computer, Inc. in 1977 and 
changed its name to Apple Inc. in 2007. See Apple Corps Limited v Apple Computer, Inc. [2006] EWHC 996 
[3]; N. Rawlinson, “History of Apple 1976-2016”, available at 
http://www.macworld.co.uk/feature/apple/history-of-apple-steve-jobs-what-happened-mac-computer-3606104/ 
(accessed 24 March 2017). 
6 Though its record profits seem to have peaked in 2015: V. Goel, “After 13 Years, Apple Revenue Drops” The 
New York Times, April 27 2016; R. Neate, “Apple’s Annual Profits Fall for First Time in 15 Years as iPhone 
Sales Decline”, The Guardian, 25 October 2016; available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/25/apple-profits-sales-decline-2016-iphone-7 (accessed 24 
March 2017).  
7 Since 2000, Interbrand has produced an annual ranking of the “Best Global Brands” by “brand value” in 
conjunction with Business Week magazine. Apple has been ranked as the most valuable global brand since 2013, 
when it overtook Coca-Cola. For details of their rankings and methodology, see www.interbrand.com (accessed 
24 March 2017). 
8 J. Froud et al, “Financialization across the Pacific: Manufacturing Cost Ratios, Supply Chains and Power”, 
(2014) 25 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 46-57 See also the working paper on which this article is based: 
J. Froud et al, “Apple Business Model: Financialization across the Pacific”, (2012) CRESC Working Paper no. 
111, available at http://www.cresc.ac.uk/medialibrary/workingpapers/wp111.pdf (accessed 24 March 2017). See 
further C. Duhigg and K. Bradsher, “How the U.S Lost Out on iPhone Work”, The New York Times, January 21 
2012; R. Fernandez and R. Hendrikse, “Rich Corporations, Poor Societies: The Financialisation of Apple”, 
(GoodElectronics, SOMO, 2015) available at https://www.somo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Rich-
corporations-poor-societies.pdf (accessed 24 March 2017).  
9 There has been recognition of the importance of this contribution in literature on business and economic 
history: see n. 4.  
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rather than their role in the development of firms and the dynamics of value chains.10 
However, the organisational role of trade marks and brands has been important. They have 
contributed to the responses of firms to changing economic conditions such as the 
industrialisation of production and the new forms of technology and communication that 
emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries.11 Together with company law, 
trade mark law contributes to an overall law of business organisation that can engage 
fruitfully with literature from other disciplines on business organisation and the evolution 
of value chains.12  
The aim of this article is to show how firms can use trade marks and brands to gain and 
exploit corporate power and to transform themselves as organisations in order to maintain 
or increase that power and to exploit it to a much greater extent. It will argue that 
recognition of this contribution is important to understanding and analysing corporate 
power and seeking to control it. The article will also consider how trade marks can be a 
source of excessive power and how the law has developed to provide some mitigation of this 
risk. However, these developments have sometimes lacked the conceptual clarity that 
explicit recognition of their relevance to corporate power could provide. The article will 
proceed as follows. Section 2 will consider the legal nature of the trade mark and its 
relationship to the concept of a brand. Section 3 will address the nature of corporate power 
and those sources of it to which brands contribute. Section 4 will look at how firms can use 
brands to attract specific demand and gain market power and at the legal rights that 
support and limit this capacity. Section 5 will consider the organisational and supply-side 
role of brands. Section 6 will draw some conclusions. 
 
2. Brands and Trade Marks 
                                                          
10 On the organisational role of trade marks, see A.P. Griffiths, An Economic Perspective on Trade Mark Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) at 165-217; M. Chon, “Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in Global Value 
Networks”, (2014) 47 UC Davis Law Review 935-968. 
11 M. Wilkins, n. 4; T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, n. 4; T. da Silva Lopes and P. Guimaraes, n. 4. 
12 On business organisation, see, for example, G.B. Richardson, “The Organisation of Industry”, (1972) 82 
Economic Journal 883-896; R.N. Langlois and N.J. Foss, “Capabilities and Governance: The Rebirth of 
Production in the Theory of Economic Organization”, (1999) 52 Kyklos 201-218; R.N. Langlois, “The 
Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism”, (2003) 12 Industrial and Corporate 
Change 351-385. On value chains, see, for example, R.C. Feenstra, “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of 
Production in the Global Economy”, (1998) 12 Journal of Economic Perspectives 31-50; G. Gereffi, J. 
Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, “The Governance of Global Value Chains”, (2005) 12 Review of International 
Political Economy 78-104; S. Ponte and T. Sturgeon, “Explaining Governance in Global Value Chains: A 
Modular Theory-Building Effort”, (2014) 21 Review of International Political Economy 195-223; S. Azmeh and 
K. Nadvi, “Asian Firms and the Restructuring of Global Value Chains”, (2014) 23 International Business 
Review 707-717. 
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The term “brand” is familiar in marketing and related disciplines, but does not have a 
recognised legal definition.13 It describes a distinctive and exclusive identity that a firm can 
confer on its products to facilitate their marketing to consumers and to provide a focus for 
consumer demand and loyalty.14 The fact that it is under the exclusive control of one firm 
gives it the capacity to acquire a reputation and image that may increase the appeal of 
these products. In some cases, a brand may be a distinctive identity that encompasses a 
firm’s culture and style as a business organisation and connects the firm’s products to that 
culture and style.15 A brand is signified through a name and other signs and these are likely 
to be registered as trade marks. Brands have come to be recognised as valuable intangible 
resources in their own right and efforts have been made to value them to demonstrate their 
importance in commercial life,16 as with the annual ranking exercise conducted by 
Interbrand.17  
The term “trade mark” is legally defined, being a sign that is capable of 
distinguishing the products “of one undertaking” from those “of other undertakings”.18 It 
should therefore be a word, word combination, logo or other sign that consumers of a 
particular kind of product are likely to recognise as signifying that the specific products 
that it designates and distinguishes (“branded products”) have a specific commercial 
origin.19 Firms can gain exclusive rights over distinctive signs to use for this purpose 
through registering them as trade marks. Systems for registering signs as trade marks had 
emerged in their modern form along with a degree of regulation at the international level by 
                                                          
13 See, for example, J. Phillips, Trade Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 7-10; 
W.R. Cornish, Intellectual Property: Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant? (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 
73-114; J. Davis and S.M. Maniatis, “Trademarks, Brands, and Competition” in T. da Silva Lopes and P. 
Duguid (eds), Trademarks, Brands, and Competitiveness (Routledge, 2013) (paperback edition) 119-137 at 120-
122; D.R. Desai and S. Weber Waller, “Brands, Competition, and Antitrust Law” in D.R. Desai, I. Lianos and S. 
Weber Waller (eds.), Brands, Competition Law and IP (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 75-112 at 77-83. 
14 See, for example, the definitions of a brand as “a name, logo, or symbol intended to distinguish a particular 
seller’s offerings from those of competitors” on the basis that “[s]trong, relevant identities for specific branded 
offerings enhance a firm’s profitability and influence the terms of competition in its industry”: N.F. Koehn, Brand 
New: How Entrepreneurs Earned Consumers’ Trust from Wedgwood to Dell (Harvard Business School Press, 
2001) at 4-5; and as “a name, term, symbol, or design (or combination of these) used by a firm to identify its 
goods or services and differentiate them from the competition”: T. da Silva Lopes and P. Duguid, “Introduction: 
Brands and Competitiveness”, in T. da Silva Lopes and P. Duguid (eds), Trademarks, Brands, and 
Competitiveness (Routledge, 2013) (paperback edition) 1-8 at 1 . 
15 A. George, “Brand Rules: When Branding Lore meets Trade Mark Law”, (2006) 13 Brand Management 215-
232; J. Davis and S.M. Maniatis, n. 13; C.A. Corrado and J.X. Hao, “Brands as Productive Assets: Concepts, 
Measurement and Global Trends”, (2014) WIPO Economic Research Working Paper No. 13, available at  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_econstat_wp_13.pdf  (accessed 24 March 2017). 
16 J. Davis, “The Value of Trade Marks: Economic Assets and Cultural Icons”, in Y. Gendreau (ed.), Intellectual 
Property: Bridging Aesthetics and Economics (Éditions Thémis, 2006) 97-124 at 110-117.  
17 See n. 7. 
18 Directive, art. 2; 2015 Directive, art. 3; 1994 Act, s. 1. See also the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 3, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C (“the TRIPs Agreement 1994”), art. 15(1). 
19 This means that one particular undertaking has authorised the use of the trade mark to market the products in 
question and that this undertaking has control over the products when they are first marketed with this identity: 
Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38]-[39]. 
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the end of the nineteenth century.20 Trade marks have to be registered for a particular kind 
(or kinds) of products and this specification limits the scope of the exclusive rights that the 
trade mark’s proprietor (or “owner”) acquires over the relevant sign,21 although their scope 
can cover the use of identical and similar signs in relation to other kinds of product and 
expands as the trade mark gains wider recognition with consumers.22 To prevent abuse of 
the system, firms cannot register signs as trade marks that relevant consumers are unlikely 
to perceive as signifying a specific commercial origin or signs that have some other meaning 
or significance to relevant consumers 23 
In broad terms therefore, a trade mark is a legally protectable sign that signifies a 
brand and a brand is an exclusive identity that a trade mark signifies and can confer on 
products of a particular kind or kinds. However, the relationship between the two may not 
always be so straightforward in practice. A firm may use more than one trade mark to signify 
a particular brand, it may use these signs in varying combinations and it may change one or 
more of them over time.24 A firm may use certain trade marks to signify a discrete brand for 
a particular line of products and others to signify an overarching corporate or umbrella 
brand that covers its overall activities or a range of product brands.25 The ability of firms to 
present simple, distinctive and personable identities to consumers when marketing their 
products has been an important contributor to their capacity to gain and secure market 
                                                          
20 L. Bently, “The Making of Modern Trade Mark Law: The Construction of the Legal Concept of Trade Mark 
(1860-1880)” in L. Bently, J. Davis and J. Ginsberg (eds), Trade Marks and Brands: An Interdisciplinary 
Critique (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 3-41; P. Duguid, T. da Silva Lopes, and J. Mercer, “Reading 
Registrations: An Overview of 100 Years of Trademark Registrations in France, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States”, in T. da Silva Lopes and P. Duguid (eds), Trademarks, Brands, and Competitiveness (Routledge, 
2013) (paperback edition) 9-30. The main regulation at the international level is under the Paris Union 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883 (as subsequently revised and as 
amended) (“the Paris Convention”); and under the TRIPs Agreement 1994. 
21 This is on the basis that the applicant should already be using the sign to market products of this kind or have 
a genuine intention to do so. To ease searching and assessment of a proposed mark’s acceptability for 
registration, the Trade Marks Register is divided into 45 classes (34 for goods and 11 for services) in accordance 
with the Nice Agreement of 1957 (as amended). However, the kind of products for which a trade mark is to be 
registered must be specified with precision within a particular class: Case C-307/10 CIPA v Registrar of Trade 
Marks (“IP Translator”) [2013] Bus LR 740. 
22 See section 4 below. 
23 A proposed trade mark must be refused registration if it is “devoid of any distinctive character”: Directive, art. 
3(1) (b); 2015 Directive, art. 4(1)(b); 1994 Act, s. 3(1)(b). There are also exclusions on the registration of signs 
that consist entirely of place, names, descriptive terms, customary signs or other signs with “non-origin” 
significance to consumers: Directive, art. 3(1)(c) and (d); 2015 Directive, art. 4(1) (c) and (d); 1994 Act, s. 
3(1)(c) and (d). An applicant can only overcome these exclusions through showing that relevant consumers have 
come to perceive them as trade marks following their use as such in practice: Case C-215/14 Société des 
Produits Nestlé v Cadbury [2015] Bus LR 1034 [59]-[60]. The Directive also precludes the registration of 
certain shapes as trade marks to prevent firms gaining an unfair monopoly over standard, useful or valuable 
shapes and the 2015 Directive will extend these exclusions to include “another characteristic” of a product as 
well as its shape: Directive, art. 3(1)(e); 2015 Directive, art. 4(1) (e); 1994 Act, s. 3(2). 
24 Starbucks, for example, changed the appearance of its mermaid logo in early 2011: “Starbucks drops its Name 
and the Word Coffee from its Logo”, BBC News, January 6 2011, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12125440 (accessed 24 March 2017). 
25 On the distinction between corporate and product brands, see C.A. Corrado and J.X. Hao, n. 15, at 10. 
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power through inspiring trust and loyalty in consumers.26 Nevertheless, even the trade 
marks used to signify corporate or umbrella brands must be registered for specific kinds of 
products and this may limit the overall reach of their exclusive rights and the scope of their 
power. For example, the reach of the corporate brand associated with Apple Inc. and of 
certain of its signifiers has been limited by the established presence of the firm Apple Corps 
Ltd, which the members of the band “the Beatles” had founded some years before.27 Both 
firms have used the same and similar signs for various kinds of products and this has 
limited the extent to which each one can use these signs.28  
Trade marks therefore provide the main legal support for brands. A brand is a 
resource that its owner can use to market its products more effectively and to solicit and 
attract specific demand to them. Brands can do this through conveying information about 
the branded products, in particular the fact they have a specific commercial origin. They 
can also convey information about the likely quality and other characteristics of the 
branded products because of their owners’ exclusive right to determine which products can 
be marketed as branded products.29 This exclusive right enables an owner to control their 
quality and other characteristics and thereby to ensure that the branded products have a 
specific and consistent level of quality and set of other characteristics that unite them and 
differentiate them from other products of the same kind. 30 In this respect, the legal 
definition of a trade mark as sign that should distinguish the products “of one undertaking” 
from those “of other undertakings” understates the role and importance of brands as 
resources for attracting and securing specific demand.31 The definition emphasises their 
exclusivity to one firm, which is the legal foundation of their potential appeal inasmuch as 
consumers can view the branding of products as signifying an acceptance of responsibility 
for them.32 However, the definition does not bring out the owner’s ability to control their 
quality and other characteristics and to ensure their consistency so that brands can be 
used to convey information about these matters as well.  
A firm may therefore establish and use various product brands to customise 
different versions of the same kind of product and to take advantage of the fact that 
consumers may have differing preferences in this respect and may even value product 
                                                          
26 R. Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in American 
Big Business (University of California Press, 2001) at 7-47; J. Kahn, “Product Liability and the Politics of 
Corporate Presence: Identity and Accountability in Macpherson v. Buick” (2001) 35 Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review 3-64 at 3-17; T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, n. 4, at 655-656. 
27 Apple Corps Limited v Apple Computer, Inc [2006] EWHC 996. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Major Bros. v Franklin [1908] 1 KB 712 (HC); Primark v Lollypop Clothing [2001] FSR 637 (HC). 
30  Andrew (John) v Kuehnrich (1913) 30 RPC 677(CA). See T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, n. 4, at 655. 
31 On the legal definition, see above at n. 18. 
32 In Scandecor Development v Scandecor Marketing, Lord Nicholls referred to a trade mark as the “aegis” and 
“banner” of its owner:  [2001] UKHL 21; [2002] FSR 122 [19]. See also Aristoc v Rysta [1945] AC 68 (HL) at 
101-102; Glaxo Group v Dowelhurst [2000] FSR 529 (HC) at 540-541. 
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differentiation for its own sake.33 Section 3 will consider the various contributions that this 
aspect of a brand can make to its potential power to attract and secure specific demand. 
However, whilst a brand may come to define branded products in terms of their likely 
quality and other characteristics as well their commercial origin, the owner is not obliged to 
ensure that these remain constant and has discretion to vary them.34 The owner also has 
discretion over the arrangements it makes for producing or procuring the branded products 
and is free to vary them.35 Section 5 will consider further how the owner’s discretion over 
these matters can further increase the overall power that the owner may enjoy. 
Finally, as well as signifying particular brands and differentiating products on this 
basis, trade marks can be used to signify that brands are economically linked to another.36 
This capacity enables firms to establish overtly-connected families of brands and provides a 
legal platform for such marketing practices as brand extension and merchandising.37 A firm 
may use a specific trade mark (or set of marks) to signify this kind of connection or it may 
use a sign that is similar to a familiar trade mark in a way that consumers are likely to 
perceive as signifying an economic connection.38 On the other hand, the owner is not 
obliged to reveal the connections that may exist between different brands that it controls 
and certain brands may have greater appeal to consumers when their economic 
connections are obscured.39 
 
3. Corporate Power 
The high values given to Apple and other leading brands in the Interbrand Top 100 reflect 
their capacity to attract specific demand to and command premium prices for their 
                                                          
33 On the rise of competition based on product customisation and product differentiation, see, for example, W. 
Streeck, “Citizens as Consumers: Considerations on the New Politics of Consumption”, (2012) 76 New Left 
Review 27-47 at 28-36; . 
34 Bostitch Trade Mark [1963] RPC 183 at 197; Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38].  
35 The commercial origin that a trade mark guarantees “is not defined by reference to the manufacturer but by 
reference to the point of control of manufacture”: Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [37]. 
36 Trade mark law protects this capacity through treating the creation of a false impression of such a connection 
as a form of “confusion” and therefore as potential infringement of the trade mark.This is discussed further in 
section 4 below. 
37 On brand extension, also known as “brand stretching”, see J.P. Choi, “Brand Extension as Informational 
Leverage”, (1998) 65 Review of Economic Studies 655-669;  L.M. Pepall and D.J. Richards, “The Simple 
Economics of Brand Stretching”, (2002) 75 Journal of Business 535-552. On merchandising, see AG Colomer’s 
discussion of this in the Arsenal FC case: Case C-206/01 Arsenal FC plc v Matthew Reed [2003] ECR I-10273 
[AG84]. 
38 Case C-251/95 Sabel v Puma  [1997] ECR I-6013 [22]-[23]; Case C-120/04 Medion v Thomson Multimedia 
[2005] ECR I-8551 [27]-[28]; Case C-361/04 Ruiz-Picasso v OHIM [2006] ECR I-643 [19]-[20]; Case C-252/12 
Specsavers v Asda [2013] Bus LR 1277 [34]-[35].  
39 On the limitations of branding as a source of information about commercial provenance, see, for example, M. 
Chon (2014), n. 10; M. Chon, “Trademark Goodwill as a Public Good: Brands and Innovations in Corporate 
Social Responsibility”, forthcoming in (2017) 21 Lewis & Clark Law Review, also available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2870029 (accessed 24 March 2017). 
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products.40 In Corporate Power and Responsibility, John Parkinson linked corporate power 
to market power of this kind and to the consequential bargaining power that it enables 
some firms to exert over other parties in their value chains including their employees.41 
Parkinson saw market power along with discretionary power over such matters as what to 
produce, where and how to produce it and whom to employ in producing it as giving large 
firms extensive social decision-making power that significantly affects the lives and 
interests of other parties.42 Parkinson argued that their possession of this power requires 
justification and supports the view that large firms should be required to be socially 
responsible and act in the public interest.43 The ability of firms to use trade marks to brand 
their products and engage in marketing can contribute to both sources of the power that 
large firms enjoy and also makes it harder to require them to be socially responsible and act 
in the public interest. 
 
3.1 Brands and Market Power 
Market power tends to be associated with monopolistic power, but a firm has a form of this 
power whenever it supplies products that are differentiated in a way that prevents 
consumers from finding exact substitutes on the market.44 Market power can increase a 
firm’s bargaining power over other parties in a value chain if these parties do not have some 
similar capacity to resist the pressures of competition or have some other form of 
countervailing power.45 Firms can use brands to differentiate their products and engage in 
marketing to attract specific demand to these products even when they do not deal with 
consumers directly.46 The interesting question is why the differentiation achieved through 
branding products may attract specific demand. 
                                                          
40 See n. 7 above. 
41 J.E. Parkinson, n. 3, at 8-21. “A widely accepted understanding of power is that it is the ability of A to cause 
B to behave in a manner intended by A that B would not have done without A’s intervention. Implicit is the idea 
that A has some form of control over B, or at least a strong bargaining position, that enables A to score a 
‘victory’ over B”: op.cit. at 8, citing G.K. Wilson, Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction (Chatham 
House Publishers, 1990) (2nd ed.) at 6. 
42 J.E. Parkinson, n. 3, at 10, referring to C. Kaysen, “The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?”, in 
E.S. Mason (ed), The Corporation in Modern Society (Harvard University Press, 1959) 85-105.  
43 J.E. Parkinson, n. 3, at 10. 
44 E.H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (OUP, 1949) (6th ed.) at 56-57; E.H. Chamberlin, 
“Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy”, (1950) 40 American Economic Review 85-92 at 86. See further I. 
Lianos, “Brands, Product Differentiation and EU Competition Law” in D.R. Desai, I. Lianos and S. Weber 
Waller (eds.), Brands, Competition Law and IP (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 146-178 at 148-152. 
45 J.K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Houghton Mifflin, 1952); C.M. 
Snyder, “Countervailing Power” in S.N. Durlauf and L.E. Blume (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics (2nd. ed.) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online 
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_C000538&goto=countervailingpower&result_num
ber=736  (accessed 24 March 2017). 
46 On the importance of marketing to the development of upstream firms, see n. 4.  
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Section 2 has shown how brands differentiate products in two ways and the capacity 
of a brand to attract specific demand can be analysed accordingly. First, the brand 
represents a specific commercial origin and establishes commercial responsibility for the 
branded products.47 Secondly, branded products are likely to have a particular set of 
characteristics including a particular level of quality in common and may therefore attract 
demand from consumers seeking products with this particular combination of 
characteristics. A brand may in effect define the branded products in terms of their quality 
and characteristics as well as in terms of their commercial origin.48 However, the brand 
does not guarantee the quality and characteristics of the branded products in any objective 
sense, but merely signifies that they are likely to be consistent with each other and to 
remain so over time.49 This likelihood of consistency along with the fact that it is under the 
exclusive control of one firm can still be valuable to consumers as a basis for acquiring and 
conveying information about products, for forming expectations and for expressing 
preferences. It is a basis for communication that has particular advantages over an 
objective definition of the products in terms of their quality and characteristics. The level of 
consistency that can be achieved and signified through a brand can be deep and 
encompass characteristics that would be hard, if not impossible, to express precisely in 
objective and reproducible terms. Branded products may have a unique character because 
they reflect a unique body of knowledge, skills and capabilities that a particular firm has 
built up.50  
The fact that brand owners are not legally obliged to maintain a constant and 
consistent level the quality and set of other characteristics for a particular brand of 
products creates a risk of disappointment for consumers when owners take advantage of 
the scope this gives them to change product characteristics or to take other action that may 
affect product quality, for example in order to reduce production costs.51 However, this 
flexibility can also be a source of benefit. It gives brand owners the scope to develop and 
improve their products and to engage in other forms of innovation.52 Firms can use their 
                                                          
47 Advocate General Jacobs recognised the value of the commercial responsibility that a trade mark establishes 
and signifies in his Opinion in Hag II: “although trade marks do not provide any form of legal guarantee of 
quality … they do in economic terms provide such a guarantee, which is acted upon daily by consumers”: Case 
C-10/89 Cnl Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR I-3711; [1990] 3 CMLR 571 at 583. Lord Nicholls also recognised its 
value in his judgment in Scandecor Development v Scandecor Marketing: “Thus, in relying on a trade mark 
consumers rely, not on any legal guarantee of quality, but on the proprietor of a trade mark having an economic 
interest in maintaining the value of his mark. It is normally contrary to a proprietor’s self-interest to allow the 
quality of goods sold under his banner to decline”: [2001] ETMR 800 [19]. 
48 See n. 30. 
49 Bostitch Trade Mark [1963] RPC 183 at 197; Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38].  
50 They may therefore reflect “tacit knowledge” as a unique input: M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a 
Post-Critical Philosophy (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) (corrected edition) at 49-65. 
51 The commercial sanction that the owner faces is the risk that its brand may lose its reputation and its power to 
attract demand. A classic example of this is the rapid decline of Schlitz beer in the United States in the 1970s 
and 1980s: see, for example, A. Goldfarb, “Schlitz: Why the Schlitz Hit the Fan”, in V.J. Tremblay and C.H. 
Tremblay (eds), Industry and Firm Studies (4th ed) (2007, Routledge) 321-341. 
52 T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, n. 4. 
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brands as a basis for alerting consumers to such changes if they so decide and use the 
reputation of their brands to provide reassurance against and mitigate the risks of 
innovation. In the event of problems or setbacks, they can use the trade marks signifying 
their brands as communication devices to warn consumers about these, to recall products 
if necessary and to provide the guidance or reassurance that may be required. A good track 
record concerning responses to setbacks and mistakes can enhance a brand’s appeal to 
consumers,53 as can building a reputation as an innovator and pioneer.54 This highlights 
the importance of a brand’s signification of a specific commercial origin. It links products on 
the market to their overall commercial provenance and in effect turns this into a set of 
intangible product characteristics. This enables consumers to take account of matters 
relating to the commercial origin of products into their decision-making if they so desire. 
These include the owner’s reputation as a business actor and its track record for business 
behaviour and compliance with standards of social responsibility.55 They may also include 
the behaviour and standards of firms upstream in the products’ value chain and could also 
include the behaviour and standards of downstream firms as well, though this would 
depend on the owner’s legal ability to control their downstream movement.56 
The ability of firms to use brands to gain market power through attracting specific 
demand in the ways described above is not necessarily a cause for concern.57 The 
exclusivity, product information and commercial accountability that a brand represents is 
of potential value to consumers for at least two reasons, both of which reflect that fact that 
markets in practice tend to diverge from the ideal conditions of a perfectly competitive 
market.58 One reason is that firms do not usually supply products (of a particular generic 
kind) that are homogeneous in terms of their quality and other characteristics, and compete 
on price alone. Instead, firms tend to supply differentiated products and to compete on the 
quality and other characteristics of their products as well as on price.59 Consumers’ 
preferences on these matters and their willingness to trade them against price can differ 
significantly and they may even value difference for its own sake.60 The specific demand 
                                                          
53 For examples of this, see N.F. Koehn, n. 14 at 321-326. 
54 G. S. Carpenter and K. Nakamoto, “Consumer Preference Formation and Pioneering Advantage”, (1989) 26 
Journal of Marketing Research 285-298. 
55 S. Hilton, “The Social Value of Brands”, in R. Clifton and J. Simmons (eds), Brands and Branding (The 
Economist in association with Profile Books, 2003) 47-64 at 55. 
56 A.P. Griffiths, “Trade Marks and Responsible Capitalism”, (2012) 43 International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 798-824. On the limitations and shortcomings of this capacity, see also M. 
Chon, “Marks of Rectitude”, (2009) 77 Fordham Law Review 2311-2351; M. Chon (2014), n. 10; M. Chon 
(2017), n. 39.The owner’s downstream control will be addressed in section 5. 
57 E.H. Chamberlin (1950), n. 44, at 86; I. Lianos, n. 44, at 148 and 152. 
58 On this ideal, see E.H. Chamberlin (1949), n. 44, at 6; R. Van den Bergh and P. Camasasca, European 
Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at 19-23. 
59 L. Abbott, Quality and Competition: An Essay in Economic Theory (Columbia University Press, 1955); D.A. 
Garvin, “Competing on the Eight Dimensions of Quality”, (1987) 65 Harvard Business Review 101-109. 
60 N. Economides, “The Economics of Trademarks”, (1988) 78 Trademark Reporter 523-539 at 526-527. On the 
meaning of “quality” in this respect, see further D.A. Garvin, “What does ‘Product Quality’ really mean?”, 
(1984) 26 Sloan Management Review 25-43; J.M. Juran, Juran’s Quality Control Handbook (McGraw-Hill, 
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that a brand attracts may therefore, in part at least, reflect these preferences. The CJEU 
has ruled that a system of undistorted competition should enable firms to gain and protect 
a competitive advantage based on the particular quality of their products.61  
A second reason why a brand may attract specific demand is the information and 
reassurance that it can provide to consumers about matters of potential concern to them. 
In contrast to the hypothetical perfectly competitive market, consumers are in practice 
unlikely to have perfect information about the quality and other characteristics of 
competing products and about the firms responsible for their presence on the market. 
Consumers can therefore face substantial costs in mitigating this deficiency, along with any 
remaining risk of disappointment, in addition to the market price of these products.62 
Brands can help to reduce these “search costs” significantly, and thereby significantly 
reduce the overall price that consumers have to pay, through facilitating access to 
information and providing reassurance.63 The force behind their capacity to do this is not a 
legal obligation, but the commercial accountability they establish and their owners’ 
incentive to ensure the reliability of their brands in order to maximise their appeal.64 This 
capacity benefits consumers not only through reducing their search costs, but also through 
increasing the incentive that firms have to supply high quality products and to maintain or 
improve the quality of their products.65 In effect, a brand invites consumers to place their 
trust in it as a substitute for the information they lack and its power to attract specific 
demand reflects the willingness of consumers to place their trust in it.66 
The ability to use trade marks to brand their products has therefore given firms in 
many industries, especially consumer-facing ones, an additional basis on which they can seek 
to attract specific demand to their products and gain a competitive advantage. A broader set of 
                                                          
1988) at 2-3; C.A. Reeves and D.A. Bednar, “Defining Quality: Alternatives and Implications”, (1994) 19 
Academy of Management Review 419-445 at 420-421. 
61 Case C-10/89 Cnl Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR I-3711 [13]; Case C-427/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v Paranova  
[1996] ECR I-3457[43]; Case C-349/95 Loendersloot (Frits) v Ballantine [1997] ECR I-6227 [22]. 
62 G. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, (1970) 84 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 488-500; P. Nelson, “Information and Consumer Behaviour”, (1970) 78 
Journal of Political Economy 311-329; M.R. Darby and E. Karni, “Free Competition and the Optimal Amount 
of Fraud”, (1973) 16 Journal of Law and Economics 67-88; N. Economides, n. 60. 
63 W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, “Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective”, (1987) 30 Journal of Law and 
Economics 265-309; N. Economides, n. 60; W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law (The Belknap Press, 2003) at 174-179; S.L. Dogan and M.A. Lemley, “Trademark 
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet”, (2004) 41 Houston Law Review 777-838. 
64 On this incentive, see the comments of Advocate General Jacobs and Lord Nicholls cited in n. 47. Its effect 
has been portrayed as a “self-enforcing” guarantee that a brand’s track record will be maintained: W.M. Landes 
and R.A. Posner (1987), n. 63, at 270. For empirical studies, see, for example, I. Png and D. Reitman, “Why are 
Some Products Branded and Others Not?”, (1995) 38 Journal of. Law and Economics 207-224; S. Wiggins and 
D. Raboy, “Price Premia to Name Brands: An Empirical Analysis”, (1996) 44 Journal of Industrial Economics 
377-388.  
65 G. Akerlof, n. 62; W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner (2003), n. 63. 
66 A. Katz, “Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks”, (2011) 5 Brigham 
Young University Law Review 1555-1608; A.P. Griffiths, “Trade Marks and Quality Assurance” in G. Dinwoodie 
(ed), Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2013)) 129-150. 
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changes in the relationship between the producers and consumers in industrialised economies 
dating back to the late nineteenth century has increased the importance and potential value to 
firms of being able to brand their products and use the trade marks signifying them to engage 
in marketing and provide information and reassurance to consumers.67 Previously producers 
had been closer to consumers, selling products directly to them, and consumers could rely on 
their personal knowledge of a producer’s track record or recommendations from people they 
trusted. This proximity would be the basis of a firm’s good reputation and other elements of 
the goodwill that would enable it to attract specific demand.68 The industrialisation of 
production along with developments in transport and communication increased the distance 
between producers and consumers and eroded this basis for knowledge and trust.69 This 
opened up a space in which firms could grow in size and power and engage in new forms of 
activity to attract demand such as advertising and marketing.70 But it also required new 
mechanisms for providing reassurance to consumers, inspiring their trust and building 
goodwill.71 Retailers and other intermediaries dealing directly with (or operating closer to) 
consumers could help to fulfil this role, which would then give them strategic power in the 
value chains that opened up between producers and consumers.72  
With the trade mark system in place, producers and other firms operating upstream 
from consumers could use trade marks to brand their products and give them distinctive 
identities that were capable of acquiring good reputations and becoming something in which 
consumers could place their trust. Firms could also use their trade marks to communicate 
directly with consumers about their branded products and to form the kind of relationships 
with them that could inspire trust and confidence. Trade marks are an effective basis for 
communication because of their simplicity and salience as signifiers, which enables them to 
become distinctive presences in the minds of consumers. Upstream firms could reinforce their 
control over branded products and protect their ability to vouch for them through packaging 
them and distributing them in a form that would prevent subsequent interference or at least 
                                                          
67 On this importance, see n. 4. See further R. Church and C. Clark, “Product Development of Branded, 
Packaged Household Goods in Britain, 1870-1914: Colman’s, Reckitt’s and Lever’s”, (2001) 2 Enterprise and 
Society 503-542; R. Fitzgerald, “Products, Firms and Consumption: Cadbury and the Development of 
Marketing, 1900-1939”, (2005) 47 Business History 511-531; S. Schwarzkopf, “Turning Trade Marks into 
Brands: How Advertising Agencies Practiced and Conceptualized Branding, 1900-1930”, in T. da Silva Lopes 
and P. Duguid (eds), Trademarks, Brands and Competitiveness (Routledge, 2013) (paperback edition) 165-193.  
68 B. Klein and K.B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance”, (1981) 89 
Journal of Political Economy 615-641. This is in keeping with Lord Eldon’s narrow and locational view of 
goodwill as “nothing more than the probability that the old customers will resort to the old place”: Cruttwell v. 
Lye (1810) 17 Ves. Jr. 335 at 346. 
69 R.N. Langlois (2003), n. 12. 
70 G. Austin, “Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination”, (2004) 69 Brooklyn Law Review 827-922 at 843 and 
851-852; Z. Bauman, Consuming Life (Polity Press, 2007) at 26. 
71 This development can be seen in Lord Macnaghten’s classic definition of “goodwill”, which in contrast to 
Lord Eldon’s emphasis on place in Cruttwell v Lye, n. 68, presents it in more abstract terms as “the benefit and 
advantage of the good name, reputation, and connection of a business. It is the attractive force that brings in 
custom. It is the one thing which distinguishes an old-established business from a new business at its first start”: 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Muller & Co.’s Margarine [1901] AC 217 at 223-224. 
72 R.N. Langlois (2003), n. 12, at 355-358. 
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make it difficult.73 This practice has increased the need for consumers to base their 
purchasing decisions on branding and to place their trust in a brand rather than to rely on the 
information they can obtain or discern about the specific products they are proposing to buy. 
In effect, brands can become proxies for products as objects of demand. The rise of the World 
Wide Web as a forum for communication, search and transacting has further increased the 
importance of branding as a basis for search and decision-making.  
The ability of firms to use trade marks to brand their products has therefore enabled 
them to compete on the basis of the capacity of their brands to inspire trust as well as on 
the price and particular merits of their products. It has enabled firms to do this regardless 
of their location in a value chain. The market power that firms can gain in this way has 
social value insofar as it helps to correct market failure, but possession of it can put firms 
in a strong bargaining position in relation to consumers and other parties. A firm that is in 
a good position to reach a wide range consumers through marketing activity or otherwise 
and to vouch for the products it supplies can use this position not only to attract specific 
demand, but also to strengthen its bargaining power with other parties in its value chain, 
both upstream and downstream. One reason why the ability to attract specific demand 
through branding can give a firm significant market power is that it tends to reduce the 
elasticity of the demand as well as ensuring that it is directed specifically to products that 
only the firm can supply.74 A number of factors may contribute to this tendency and not all 
of them are consistent with the idea of branding as socially beneficial and conducive to 
competition.75 A brand’s effectiveness at reducing search costs is likely to increase as it 
becomes familiar to consumers and gains a good reputation in their minds. Some 
consumers may attach significant value to the reassurance that a familiar brand can 
provide, especially if they are risk-averse,76 and this can make it much harder to substitute. 
This, along with other factors discussed below, can also increase the overall “switching 
costs” that consumers face in switching their demand to an alternative.77 Moreover, once a 
                                                          
73 Impeding “the possibility of intermediate examination” in this way such that a retailer or other intermediary is 
“merely the vehicle of transmission of the products to the consumer” increases the legal responsibility of the 
brand owner to the consumer for the branded products through establishing the proximity that gives rise to a 
direct duty of care and a basis for product liability: see, for example, Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562-623 
at 598 (Lord Atkin) and 615 (Lord Macmillan). See also MacPherson v Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 N.Y. 382, 
discussed in J. Kahn, n. 26. 
74 On elasticity of demand, see P. Newman, “Elasticity” in S.N. Durlauf and L.E. Blume (eds), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd. ed.) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics Online http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_E000058 (accessed 24 March 
2017). 
75 See, for example, R. Brown, “Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols”, (1948) 
57 Yale Law Journal 1165-1206 at 1169; E.H.Chamberlin (1950), n. 44,at 88; J. Davis and S.M. Maniatis, n. 13; 
D.S. Gangjee, “Property in Brands”, in H.R. Howe and J. Griffiths, Property Concepts in Intellectual Property 
Law (CUP, 2013) 29-59. 
76 On risk aversion, see J. Warner, “Risk Aversion” in S.N. Durlauf and L.E. Blume (eds), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics (2nd. ed.) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
Online http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_R000155 (accessed 24 March 2017). 
77 G.B. Ramello and F. Silva, “Appropriating Signs and Meaning: The Elusive Economics of Trademark”, 
(2006) 15 Industrial and Corporate Change 937-963 at 946-949. On switching costs, see P. Klemperer, 
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firm has invested in building up the reputation and  appeal of a brand, it can confer this 
appeal on branded products at a relatively low marginal cost, giving it a significant 
competitive advantage. On the positive side, some economic analysists have characterised 
the enhanced effectiveness of a familiar brand as a valuable capacity to reduce consumers’ 
“mental search costs” because it speeds the processing of information and facilitates rapid 
decision-making.78 A brand with this kind of appeal is much more vulnerable as a target for 
bad publicity, which should further increase its value as a basis for commercial 
accountability and source of reassurance.79  
The argument that the power of brands to attract specific demand is socially 
beneficial overall also rests on the assumption that consumers are ultimately rational in 
their decision-making. This assumption has been challenged on the basis that in practice 
various “irrational” factors may influence the strength of specific demand for branded 
products sold under certain brands and not just “rational” factors such as their price, quality 
and other characteristics and the reassurance that the brand provides about these.80 These 
“irrational” factors include the salience and cognitive availability of a brand’s signifiers81 and 
any emotional attachment that some consumers may have to the brand.82 The potential of a 
brand to inspire loyalty is a consequence of the distinctive and exclusive personality that it 
confers on products, which can give it a unique heritage, an image and even associate it 
with a set of values.83 This can turn what would otherwise be discrete acts of consumption 
into a relationship and continuing experience.84 The scope for using branding to appeal to the 
emotional desires of consumers is associated with the rise of “consumerism” in the twentieth 
century.85 For a wide range of products, consumers have come to place much greater value 
                                                          
“Switching Costs” in in S.N. Durlauf and L.E. Blume (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd. 
ed.) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online P. Klemperer, “Switching 
Costs” http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_S000460 (accessed 24 March 2017). 
78 W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner (2003), n. 63, at 161 and 207. For a critical appraisal, see R. Tushnet, “Gone in 
Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science”, (2008) 86 Texas Law Review 507-568. 
79 B. Klein and K.B. Leffler, n. 68, at 629-633; C. Shapiro, “Consumer Information, Product Quality and Seller 
Reputation”, (1982) 13 Bell Journal of Economics 20-35; C. Shapiro, “Premiums for High Quality Products as 
Returns to Reputations”, (1983) 98 Quarterly Journal of Economics 659-679. 
80 E.H.Chamberlin (1950), n. 44, at 88. The distinction has also been expressed as one between “functional” and 
“non-functional” demand: H. Leibenstein, “Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ 
Demand”, (1950) 64 Quarterly Journal of Economics 183-207; I. Lianos, n. 44, at 157. 
81 A. Ehrenberg, N. Barnard and J. Scriven, “Differentiation or Salience”, (1997) 37 Journal of Advertising 
Research 7-14; G.B. Ramello, “What’s In a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic Theory” (2006) 20 Journal of 
Economic Surveys 547-565 at 556-559. 
82 J.B. Swann, “An Interdisciplinary Approach to Brand Strength”, (2006) 96 Trademark Reporter 943-976; L. 
Moor, The Rise of Brands (Berg, 2007) at 37-38; B. Beebe, “Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary 
Code”, (2010) 123 Harvard Law Review 809-889. 
83 J. Kahn, n. 26, at 30-41; T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, n. 4, at 655-656.  
84 For examples of this kind of attachment, see S.M. McClure et al., “Neural Correlates of Behavioural 
Preferences for Culturally Familiar Drinks” (2004) 44 Neuron 379-387; C.L. Hays, Pop: Truth and Power at the 
Coca-Cola Company (Arrow, 2005) at 8-9.  
85 A. Offer, The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and Britain since 
1950 (Oxford University Press, 2006) at 278-286; Z. Bauman, n. 70, at 25-51. For more positive views of 
consumerism, see C. Campbell, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism (Basil Blackwell, 
1987); C. Dyhouse, Glamour: Women, History, Feminism (Zed Books, 2011). 
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on factors that differentiate them such as design, features, novelty and atmospherics as 
well as their traditional concerns with quality and price.86 Marketing practitioners have 
recognised that these factors can act as cues and influence consumers’ impressions of 
functional and material quality.87 For some products, these factors may be more important to 
consumers than traditional notions of quality such as durability, reliability and performance.88 
Brands can also increase the emotional appeal of products through connecting them to 
imagery and associations cultivated through advertising and promotional activity. This 
enables consumers to use branded products to satisfy emotional desires such as self-
expression, showing allegiance to particular values or feeling part of a distinct community 
of consumers.89  More prosperous consumers can use certain brands to signal their 
prosperity and social status,90 with a brand’s exclusivity providing the scarcity and 
premium pricing that such conspicuous consumption requires.91  
Brands therefore enable some firms to gain substantial market power based on their 
power to attract specific demand. Brands perform a valuable role as a marketing resource, 
basis for communication and source of reassurance to consumers. They also do so through 
strengthening the incentives that firms have to meet consumers’ expectations on matters 
such as product quality and help to mitigate the risks of product development and other 
forms of innovation. However, the ability to acquire and control this kind of market power, 
in effect turning it into a distinct intangible asset, is also responsible for more controversial 
manifestations of corporate power. It can give firms with an established presence in 
consumer-facing markets, or that are well-placed to establish one, a strategic advantage in 
the value chains in which they operate and the scope to shape the direction and 
organisation of economic activity. This contribution of brands can be seen in the evolution 
                                                          
86 RJ. Monsen and A. Downs, “Public Goods and Private Status”, (1971) 23 The Public Interest 64-77; W. 
Streeck, n. 33, at 28-36; C. Campbell, “The Curse of the New: How the Accelerating Pursuit of the New is 
Driving Hyper-Consumption”, in K.M. Ekström (ed), Waste Management and Sustainable Consumption 
(Routledge, 2015) 29-51. 
87 J.J. Wheatley and J.S.Y. Chiu, “The Effects of Price, Store Image, and Product and Respondent 
Characteristics on Perceptions of Quality”, (1977) 14 Journal of Marketing Research 181-186. The work of 
Louis Cheskin has been influential in this respect: see, for example, L. Cheskin, Colors and What They can do 
(Liveright Publishing, 1947); L. Cheskin, How to Predict What People Will Buy (Liveright Publishing, 1957). 
88 B.W. Tuchman, “The Decline of Quality”, New York Times Magazine, November 2 1980 at 38–41. This is a 
tendency that can be seen in the garment industry’s “fast fashion” business model: see, for example, M.B.L. 
Daly, “Buyer Behaviour for Fast Fashion”, (2006) 10 Journal of Fashion Marketing and Management 329-344; 
K. Miller, “Hedonic Customer Responses to Fast Fashion and Replicas”, (2013) 17 Journal of Fashion 
Marketing and Management 160-174. 
89 D.A. Aaker and E. Joachimsthaler, Brand Leadership: The Next Level of the Brand Revolution (The Free 
Press, 2000) at 48-49; C. Lury, Brands: The Logos of the Global Economy (Routledge, 2004) at 24 and 34. 
90 This is associated with the work of Thorstein Veblen, in particular The Theory of the Leisure Class: An 
Economic Study of Institutions (Macmillan, 1899). However, the conspicuous consumption that concerned 
Veblen was directed at more durable products than the modish and ephemeral products associated with 
consumerism: Z. Bauman, n. 70, at 30-31. 
91 For contrasting perspectives on the social value of this form of scarcity, see H. Leibenstein, n. 80; G.S. Becker 
and K.M. Murphy with E. Glaeser, “Social Markets and the Escalation of Quality: The World of Veblen 
Revisited” in G.S. Becker and K.M. Murphy (eds), Social Economics: Market Behaviour in a Social 
Environment (The Belknap Press, 2001) at 84-104; B. Beebe, n. 82. 
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of firms like Apple and the power they have over their supply chains.92 These firms have 
moved on from their traditional role associated with the model of the industrial “modern 
corporation” , which would serve the interests of various stakeholder groups in particular 
communities and nations, into that of being a financially-driven “post-national corporate 
player”.93 This contribution can also be seen in the development of the garment (or apparel) 
industry in the global economy and its adoption of the “fast fashion” business model, in 
which marketing and retail “brands” enjoy substantial market power and exercise power 
over flexible global supply chains to produce the products that they market.94  
This contribution of brands to corporate power has significance both for 
understanding and analysing its nature and for regulating firms that possess it. The 
contribution can be related to the flexible nature of trade marks and the brands that they 
signify not only as identities for marketing products, but also as a platform for organising 
the production these products. This flexibility gives brand owners significant discretionary 
power. 
 
3.2 Brands and Discretionary Power 
Parkinson saw discretionary power as well as market power as contributing to the overall 
social decision-making power of large firms and characterised this as “the power to shape 
‘the structure of opportunities’ available in society”.95 He argued that such firms do not 
respond passively to consumer demand as if they were a “productive apparatus” under the 
ultimate control of consumers for the satisfaction of their wants, but that consumers are 
instead “the manipulated subjects of producer domination”.96 In practice, firms have 
discretion as to which products they produce and supply and can engage in advertising and 
other marketing activity to shape and influence consumers’ preferences. In other words, 
they are active decision-makers rather than passive responders to external forces in the 
markets in which they operate. 
Branding has strengthened this discretionary power in a number of ways, in 
particular by enabling firms that possess it to command the market place without being (or 
remaining) producers at all. It has increased the scope that firms have to customise and 
                                                          
92 J. Froud et al, n. 8. 
93 J. Froud et al, n. 8, at 47. 
94 See, for example, S. Azmeh and K. Nadvi, n. 12; I.M. Taplin, “Who is to Blame? A Re-examination of Fast 
Fashion after the 2013 Factory Disaster in Bangladesh”, (2014) 10 Critical Perspectives on International 
Business 72-83; L. Curran and K. Nadvi, “Shifting Trade Preferences and Value Chain Impacts in the 
Bangladesh Textiles and Garment Industry”, (2015) 8 Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 
459-475.  
95 J.E. Parkinson, n. 3, at 13, citing T. Parsons, The Social System (Routledge, 1966) and discussing C. 
Lindblom, Politics and Markets (Basic Books, 1977) at 153.  
96 J.E. Parkinson, n. 3, at 13-15. 
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differentiate their products and has given them new ways of doing this.  Branding has 
enabled firms to attract demand to a range of products and to stimulate demand through 
engaging in rapid product development and innovation, as with the garment industry’s “fast 
fashion” business model.97 In the case of consumer electronics, a study of Apple has noted 
how “heavy investment in branding and marketing of iPod, iPhone and iPad backs up a 
‘seduce and capture’ retailing of affordable novelties, locking customers into utilities like 
iTunes software”.98 Branding has also enabled some firms to transform themselves as 
productive units in terms of the activities in which they engage and the capabilities they 
require and can exploit.99 Some firms have used this resource to enter new markets with 
the benefit of a familiar marketing presence and an established capacity to provide 
information and reassurance. Some firms have used it to evolve from being manufacturers 
of products to become firms that specialise in marketing and higher value activities such as 
design and product development whilst orchestrating the production and supply of the 
products they market from firms in supply chains.100 Outsourcing production can be more 
efficient, especially where the appeal of the branded products rests on rapid upgrading and 
development. Changes in technology and communication have facilitated this development 
through enabling firms to exercise greater control over production through indirect 
mechanisms based on contract. For such firms, production becomes another input they 
can obtain on competitive markets. Given the bargaining power that brand owners can gain 
over their suppliers, this can intensify competitive pressures in value chains where firms 
engaged in production have to compete for demand from downstream firms on their ability 
to minimise costs and meet tight deadlines.101  
The discretionary power that brands give their owners can therefore have a profound 
effect on the structure of opportunities for firms engaged and people employed in 
production as well as for consumers.102 The capacity to use brands to attract specific 
                                                          
97 See n. 88. 
98 J. Froud et al, n. 8, at 48. 
99 On capabilities and their importance in the development of firms and business organisation, see E. Penrose, 
The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Basil Blackwell, 1959), republished with an introduction by M. Pitelis 
(Oxford University Press, 2009); G.B. Richardson, n. 12; D.J. Teece and G. Pisano, “The Dynamic Capabilities 
of Firms: An Introduction”, (1994) 3 Industrial and Corporate Change 537-556; R.N. Langlois and N.J. Foss, n. 
12; R. N. Langlois, “Modularity in Technology and Organization”, (2002) 49 Journal of Economic Behaviour 
and Organization 19-37. 
100 C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, “Neither Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-Firm Collaboration in the 
New Economy” (2004) 5 Enterprise & Society 388-403 at 394-395; S. Berger, “Toward a Third Industrial 
Divide?” in P. Osterman (ed.), Economy in Society: Essays in Honour of Michael J. Piore (MIT Press, 2012) 
65-88 at 78. 
101 N. Klein, No Logo (Flamingo, 2000) at 201-202. The Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh in April 2013 shows 
the potential dangers of these competitive pressures and the business models that produce them: see All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Bangladesh, “After Rana Plaza: A Report into the Readymade Garment Industry in 
Bangladesh”, (2013) (“APPG Report”), available at 
http://www.annemain.com/files/attachments/APPG_Bangladesh_Garment_Industry_Report.pdf (accessed 24 
March 2017); I.M. Taplin, n. 94; Social Europe Report no. 3, “After Rana Plaza (January 2015), available at 
https://www.socialeurope.eu/book/ser-3-after-rana-plaza/ (accessed 24 March 2017). 
102 J. Froud et al, n. 8. 
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demand and in effect to “pull” consumers to a firm’s products was essential for the 
emergence of large scale industrialised manufacturing firms in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.103 Firms of this kind became major business actors in the era of 
industrial capitalism when the scope for reconfiguring production stages through 
mechanisation in conjunction with the application of scientific management techniques 
made large scale production potentially much more efficient than smaller scale 
operations.104 Brands gave these firms the ability to reach over intermediaries and market 
their products directly to consumers who could then seek them out and demand them from 
retailers.105 Firms that would otherwise have been remote and impersonal could use this 
capacity in conjunction with advertising to provide reassurance to, inspire trust in and form 
relationships with consumers.106 This provided them with a means of securing the stable 
demand that ensured their viability as large scale industrialised manufacturers.107 
Subsequently, brands facilitated the evolution of the more flexible and marketing-oriented 
firms that emerged with the rise of consumerism and market globalisation in the later 
twentieth century.108 Even retailers have been able to take advantage of this resource and use 
their own brands (or “private labels”) to gain strategic power over their supply chains and 
challenge the power of upstream brand owners.109 The evolution of Clarks Shoes from a 
small-scale family firm into a large-scale manufacturer of shoes based in the United 
Kingdom and then into a global marketing firm that orchestrates the production of its shoes 
from an extended global supply chain illustrates the impact that this resource has had on 
the development of firms and on the organisation of economic activity more generally.110 
                                                          
103 M. Wilkins, n. 4. See also C.A. Corrado and J.X. Hao, n. 15, at 21-23.  
104 R. Murray, “Fordism and Post-Fordism” in S. Hall and M. Jacques, New Times: The Changing Face of 
Politics in the 1990s (Lawrence & Wishart, 1989) 38-53. 
105 H.G. Wells used a much-cited metaphor to portray the impact of this transformation: “even in our childhood 
there was already a number of vigorous firms reaching their hands over the retail salesman’s shoulder, so to speak, 
and offering their goods in their own name to the customer”. See H.G. Wells, The World of William Clissold 
(Ernest Benn, 1926) republished (Faber and Faber, 2008) Vol. 2 at 262-263. F.I. Schechter cited this metaphor 
in a classic article on trade mark law: “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection”, (1927) 40 Harvard Law 
Review 813-833 at 818. 
106 R. Marchand, n. 26; J. Kahn, n. 26; T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, n. 4, at 655-656. 
107 On the need for large-scale producers to secure stable demand to reduce the risks of large-scale production, 
see also J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (2nd. ed.) (Penguin, 1972), discussed in J.E. Parkinson, n. 3, at 
14. 
108 These include the “weightless” firms that Naomi Klein described in No Logo: N. Klein, n. 101. See also R. 
N. Langlois (2003), n 12; C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, n. 100; S. Berger, n. 100. 
109 In 1972, retailers were already being portrayed as “engineers or architects of complex and extended patterns of 
co-ordinated activity”: G.B Richardson, n. 12, at 885. See generally A. Ezrachi and D. Bernitz (eds.), Private 
Labels, Brands and Competition Policy: The Changing Landscape of Retail Competition (Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
110 See the “History and Heritage” section of the Clarks website at 
http://www.clarks.co.uk/historyandheritage_inthebeginning (accessed 24 March 2017). On the transformation of 
Clarks shoes into a global marketing firm, see P. Barkham, “How the Chinese fell in Love with Clarks Shoes”, 
The Guardian, 9 March 2011; available at https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/mar/09/chinese-love-
clarks-shoes (accessed 24 March 2017). On the global appeal of Clarks as a brand, see generally A. Fingers, 
Clarks in Jamaica (One Love Books, 2012).  
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Branding is therefore a facility that has enabled firms to gain significant market 
power, consequential bargaining power in their value chains and discretionary power over 
their products and their production along with the power to transform themselves as 
business actors. This resource has been a major factor in determining the shape and 
structure of business actors in a world of global markets, globally-recognised brands and 
global supply chains. Branding has contributed to corporate power in other ways as well. 
The capacity of artificial legal structures that can be complex and protean to present 
relatively simple and stable corporate and product identities to the outside world gives them 
a number of organisational benefits. It has facilitated and encouraged the development of 
complex structures, including ones that enable firms to partition assets, segregate activities 
and manage risk and to minimise their exposure to regulation and taxation.111 It has 
increased the fluidity and flexibility that they can achieve through using corporate 
personality as an external and internal structuring device. It is even possible for firms to 
locate the ownership of the trade marks that support their brands in one entity that can 
then charge royalties to other entities within the group for using these resources.112 In all 
these ways, branding has contributed to the greater focus that many leading firms have 
come to place on financial activity rather than production.113 
 
4. Brands as Resources for Attracting and Securing 
Demand 
The ability of firms to use brands as resources for attracting and securing specific demand 
depends on their gaining exclusive rights over the signs that signify their brands through 
registering them as trade marks. This section will consider how these rights shape the 
demand-side role of brands as sources of corporate power.  These rights enable firms to gain 
control over signs both as a means of branding products by conferring a distinctive and 
exclusive identity upon them and as a basis for communication about these products. Firms 
can then use these signs and the brands they signify to engage in marketing and establish 
distinctive and exclusive marketing presences with consumers. Success at this level is the 
basis of the market power that leading consumer-facing firms can enjoy and of their strategic 
power in the value chains in which they operate. 
                                                          
111 See for example P.Muchlinski, “Limited Liability and Multinational Enterprises: A Case for Reform?”, 
(2010) 34 Cambridge Journal of Economics 915-928. 
112 See for example R. Evans, “Tax Avoidance: How Big Business Cuts its Bills”, The Guardian, 10 December 
2010; available at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/dec/10/taxandspending-taxavoidance (accessed 
24 March 2017). 
113 J. Froud et al, n. 8, at 47. 
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It is intrinsic to a trade mark’s signification of a specific commercial origin that its 
owner should be entitled to prevent third parties from using the same sign to market 
products that are not branded products. This core right should cover any use of the sign 
that relevant consumers are likely to perceive as signifying the branding of products or as 
conveying information about their commercial origin. For convenience, this article will refer 
to use of a sign that has this effect as “proprietary” use of the sign to contrast it with 
“referential” use of a trade mark as a means of referring to the brand that it signifies or to 
branded products.114 However, the demand-side role of a trade mark goes much further 
than signifying an exclusive identity based on commercial origin. Its power to attract 
demand may be something that its owner can exploit on different brands of the same kind 
of product and on different kinds of product through using signs that consumers recognise 
as signifying an economic connection. The law secures this potential for exploitation 
through entitling the owner to prevent third parties from using the same and certain similar 
signs to market products of the same kind as those for which the trade mark is registered, 
products of similar kinds and in some cases products of different kinds. The law makes this 
extended protection conditional on a third party’s sign having certain effects on the trade 
mark that are liable to affect not only its legal meaning of exclusivity but also its power to 
attract demand.  In effect, through protecting this power from potential damage or unfair 
exploitation across a range of markets, trade mark law secures the ability of brand owners 
to exploit it across a range of markets. 
The demand-side role of brands also depends on the law protecting the reliability of 
trade marks as a basis for communication about branded products or connected brands. 
This involves protecting an owner’s ability to make referential use of a trade mark and 
certain similar signs and raises some additional issues to those concerned with protecting 
proprietary use. The communication role of trade marks is of particular importance where 
brand owners are operating upstream from consumers and branded products pass through 
retailers and other intermediaries before reaching consumers. Upstream firms can use 
trade marks to advertise and market their branded products directly to consumers and 
also, where they signify verbally, to reel in specific demand to these products through 
enabling consumers to express that specific demand in requests and enquiries. Brand 
owners need extensive control over how third parties use their trade marks and certain 
similar signs both in advertising and other marketing activity and in their responses to 
requests and enquiries from consumers to ensure the overall effectiveness of their trade 
marks’ demand-side role.  
 
                                                          
114 On the use of the terms “proprietary” and “referential” use of a trade mark to make this distinction, see D.W. 
Barnes, “Trademark Externalities”, (2007) 10 Yale Journal of Law & Technology 1-44. 
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4.1 Protecting and Securing the Role of Trade Marks as a Means of 
Branding Products 
In European trade mark law, the Directive specifies three grounds on which a trade mark 
may be infringed.115 The first ground applies where a third party is using “in the course of 
trade” an identical sign “in relation to” products of an identical kind to any of those for 
which the trade mark has been registered.116 As well as securing the owner’s exclusive right 
to make proprietary use of the sign, this ground appears to give the owner a broader 
monopoly covering any use of the relevant sign in a commercial context relating to the sale, 
supply or other marketing of products of a kind for which it has been registered.117 
However, the CJEU has narrowed its potential scope by introducing an additional 
condition, namely that a third party’s use of an identical sign must be “liable to have an 
adverse effect on one of the functions of the trade mark”.118 The CJEU at first ruled that 
this meant “in particular” a trade mark’s “essential function” of guaranteeing the 
commercial origin of branded products to consumers.119 This would have covered any use of 
the relevant sign that relevant consumers would perceive as proprietary,120 but would only 
have covered referential use of the trade mark where this was liable to create the 
impression of an economic connection of some kind with the trade mark.121  
The CJEU subsequently confirmed that the first ground protects other functions as 
well, which it identified as “in particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or 
services in question and those of communication, investment or advertising”.122 This 
                                                          
115 Directive, art. 5(1); 2015 Directive, art. 10(2); 1994 Act, s. 10.  
116 Directive, art. 5(1) (a); 2015 Directive, art. 10(2) (a); 1994 Act, s. 10(1).  
117 The preamble to the Directive reinforces this impression by stating that the owner’s protection “should be 
absolute in the case of identity between the mark and the sign and goods or services”: Directive, recital (11); 
2015 Directive, recital (16). The CJEU has ruled that the condition that the third party’s use must be “in the 
course of trade” requires not only that the third party’s use should take place “in the context of commercial 
activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter”, but also that the third party should be 
using the sign in question “in its own commercial communication”: Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v 
Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 [51]-[52]. 
118 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 [51]. 
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Budejovicky Budvar [2004] ECR I-10989 [59]; Case C-48/05 Adam Opel v Autec [2007] ECR I-1017 [21]; Case 
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ECR I-1279 [42]. 
120 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 [56]; Case C-245/02 Anheuser-Busch v 
Budejovicky Budvar [2004] ECR I-10989 [60]; Case C-62/08 UDV North America v Brandtraders [2009] ECR 
I-1279 [49]. There is an exception to the owner’s monopoly over proprietary use in cases of “honest concurrent 
use”: Budejovicky Budvar Narodni v Anheuser-Busch [2012] EWCA Civ 880. 
121 Case C-533/06 O2 Holdings v Hutchison 3G [2008] ECR I-4231 [59]; Case C-46/10 Viking Gas v Kosan 
Gas (C-46/10) [2011] ETMR 58 (WL) [37].  
122 Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 [58]; Case C-236/08-238/08) Google France v Louis 
Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 [79]; Case C-278/08 Die BergSpechte v Günter Guni [2010] ECR I-2517 [21]; Case 
C-558/08 Portakabin v Primakabin [2010] ECR I-6963 [29]; Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] 
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elaboration lacks precision and the CJEU has provided limited guidance.123 In substance, it 
enables the owner to use the first ground to protect a brand’s attractive power where this is 
due to more than its exclusivity, as when it has acquired an attractive image. Its main 
practical effect has been to give brand owners a stronger legal basis for controlling third 
parties’ referential use of their trade marks in comparative advertising and other 
promotional activity, which will be considered further below. 
As well as its exclusivity to one firm, a brand’s demand-side role also rests on the 
distinctiveness of its signifiers, which should enable relevant consumers to differentiate 
branded products from other products of the same kind “without any possibility of 
confusion”.124 The second ground of infringement helps to protect the distinctiveness of a trade 
mark.125 It extends protection through relaxing the first ground’s two requirements of identity 
to include similarity as well, but applies an overarching condition that a third party’s use of 
such a sign should result in “a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which 
includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the mark”. This ground covers 
similar signs that consumers are likely to confuse with the trade mark or perceive as a revised 
version of it along with signs that consumers are likely to perceive as signifying an economic 
connection with the trade mark and the brand it signifies.126 It also extends protection into 
proximate markets, which the CJEU has ruled should reflect the various ways in which 
consumers may regard products as similar to each other such as market complementarity 
and not just functional or technological similarity.127 The CJEU has indicated that a trade 
mark’s protection under this ground should increase in line with the level of recognition it 
has gained in the minds of consumers.128 The second ground of infringement therefore 
secures a brand owner’s ability to exploit its attractive power in proximate markets. The 
scope for exploitation here would usually depend on the potential economies of scope in 
terms of production, distribution or marketing, though there may be greater scope for 
exploitation where a brand has an enhanced capacity to provide reassurance or to attract 
specific demand for some other reason. The owner would still need to have sufficient control 
over the supply of products connected to the brand to enable it to protect the brand’s 
attractive power from the risk of damage from adverse publicity. However, developments in 
                                                          
123 The CJEU has described the advertising function as the use of a trade mark “as a factor in sales promotion or 
as an instrument of commercial strategy”: Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-
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technology and communication have increased the ability of firms to do this. Firms with 
brands that have this potential can develop the capabilities that enable them to exercise 
sufficient control over supply along with cultivating and exploiting the power of their brands to 
attract demand. Developments on the demand-side and the supply-side have coincided and 
reinforced each other in this respect.129 
The third ground of infringement protects a brand’s attractive power in more distant 
markets and thereby secures its owner’s ability to exploit it in these markets.130 In the United 
Kingdom, the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) first extended the scope of a trade mark’s 
protection beyond the range of products that are at least similar to those for which it is 
registered.131 This ground protects trade marks that have become familiar to consumers and 
acquired “a reputation”.132 It covers a third party’s use of an identical or similar sign in 
circumstances that cause consumers encountering it to recall the trade mark and for this 
“mental linkage” to have at least one of three designated effects on the trade mark.133 These 
effects are to cause detriment to the trade mark’s “distinctive character” (its prominence 
and singularity as a sign) or to its “repute” (its appeal to consumers based on the reputation 
and image it has acquired) or to take “unfair advantage” of these attributes without the 
third party having a good reason or “due cause” for using the sign in question.134  
In substance, the third ground protects the enhanced effectiveness that a trade 
mark may gain both as a means of branding products and as a promotional and 
communication device through gaining prominence in the minds of consumers together 
with a good reputation and an attractive image. Its prominence and enhanced effectiveness 
can make the trade mark vulnerable to a much wider range of damage and unfair 
exploitation. The third ground also helps to secure a brand owner’s ability to exploit its 
familiarity and attractive power in a much wider range of markets and provides legal 
support for the marketing practices that enable firms to do this. As noted above, 
developments in technology have increased the scope for a brand owner to exploit its power 
                                                          
129 W. Streeck, n. 33, at 28-36.  
130 The Directive, art. 5(2); 2015 Directive, art. 10(2) (c); 1994 Act, s. 10(3). Despite the apparent limitation of 
this ground to products that are “not similar” to those for which the trade mark has been registered, the CJEU 
held that it covers all kinds of products: Case C- 292/00 Davidoff & Cie v Gofkid [2003] ECR I-389 [24]. The 
specification in the 2015 Directive makes this clear. 
131 The Directive gave member states the option whether to extend protection to include this ground, but most of 
them have done so. The 2015 Directive has made it mandatory. 
132 The CJEU has ruled that to have a “reputation” the trade mark must be known by “a significant part of the 
public concerned by the products or services covered by that trade mark” and “throughout at least a substantial 
part” of the relevant territory: Case C-375/97 General Motors v Yplon [1999] ECR I-5421 [22]-[26]. 
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to provide reassurance and attract specific demand in a much wider range of markets than 
would have been feasible previously.135 
 
4.2 Protecting and Securing a Trade Mark’s Capacity as a 
Communication Device 
Once a sign is registered as a trade mark, it acquires a special meaning in relation to 
products of a kind for which it is registered as the signifier of a specific commercial 
origin.136 Its owner, consumers and other third parties should therefore be able to use it as 
a reliable reference point to convey and acquire information about branded products, 
including information about their commercial origin and provenance. However, its owner 
has an interest in seeking more extensive control both to protect the attractive power of the 
brand from potential damage and, less justifiably, to insulate branded products from 
effective competition. 
 
4.2.1 Control over Third Party Referential Use of a Trade Mark in 
Advertising and Promotional Activity 
To ensure a trade mark’s effectiveness both as a branding device and as a basis for 
communication, its owner should be entitled to prevent third parties from using it in a way 
that is inconsistent with its legal meaning or implies an economic connection with the brand 
that it signifies, especially when they are selling, supplying or marketing products of a kind for 
which the owner has registered it. This is necessary to ensure that the owner derives full 
benefit from the brand’s power to attract demand and has full control over the supply of 
products that may affect that power. The owner may seek to extend its control further to 
protect the prominence that a trade mark signifying the brand has gained in the minds of 
consumers and the image and associations that it may have there. A third party’s referential 
use of a trade mark or a similar sign in advertising or promotional activity may affect these 
even though it does not mislead consumers about the commercial origin of the third party’s 
products.  
The interest of brand owners in extending their control over third parties’ referential use of 
trade marks and similar signs in advertising and promotional activity has to be weighed 
against the third parties’ need to use them in this way to compete effectively and especially to 
                                                          
135 See above at n. 129. 
136 It is therefore necessary to restrict the signs that a firm can appropriate for this purpose and in particular to 
prevent it from registering a sign that already has a meaning relating to products of the relevant kind unless and 
until the firm succeeds in changing its meaning in the minds of consumers through using it as a trade mark in 
practice: see n. 23. 
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challenge brands that are market leaders. Referential use in comparative advertising can 
enable third parties to alert consumers to alternatives and to seek to persuade them to switch 
their demand.137 In the United Kingdom, referential use of a trade mark in advertising 
constituted infringement until the 1994 Act introduced a defence giving third parties 
extensive freedom to do this.138 The CJEU has subsequently ruled that the amended 
Directive on Misleading and Comparative Advertising (“MCAD”)139 now delineates the scope 
of this defence and determines the extent of the owner’s control.140 For the owner to be able 
to exercise this control and enforce the terms of the MCAD directly against a third party, it 
must first establish that the third party’s use of its trade mark or a similar sign in 
comparative advertising is infringement. In this regard, the CJEU has ruled that a third 
party’s referential use of a trade mark in advertising or promoting products of a kind for 
which it is registered infringes it under the first ground even when this does not mislead 
consumers about the commercial origin of the products that the third party is promoting. 
The CJEU has held that this is liable to affect the additional protected functions that it has 
identified.141 The third party therefore has to rely on a defence, which in the case of 
comparative advertising means showing that its advertisement complies with all the 
conditions of the MCAD. This gives the owner a direct legal basis for enforcing compliance 
with the MCAD. The MCAD does not just preclude referential use of a trade mark in a way 
that is liable to mislead consumers about commercial origin, but also use that may threaten 
a trade mark’s attractive power in some other way.142  
For other kinds of advertising, there are defences under the Directive that entitle 
third parties to use trade marks or similar signs to convey descriptive information about 
their products, including information for which referential use of a trade mark is 
necessary.143 These defences are subject to a proviso that the third party must be using the 
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the advertising Directive 84/450/EC as amended by Directive 97/55/EC, (“the MCAD”) defines comparative 
advertising as “any advertising which explicitly or by implication identifies a competitor or goods or services offered 
by a competitor”: Case C-112/99 Toshiba Europe v Katun [2001] ECR I-7945; Case C-44/01 Pippig Augenoptik v 
Hartlauer [2003] ECR I-3095. 
138 1994 Act, s. 10(6). Section 4 of the Trade Marks Act 1938 had provided that infringement could occur where 
a third party used a “mark” in a way that was likely to be perceived “as being used as a trade mark” or “as 
importing a reference to some person having the right … to use the trade mark”. See Bismag v Amblins [1940] 
Ch. 667 (CA). 
139 See n. 137. 
140 Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185; Case C-159/09 Lidl v Vierzon [2011] 2 CMLR 10 (WL). 
Section 10(6) of the 1994 Act has in effect become obsolete. The 2015 Directive now includes “using the sign in 
comparative advertising in a manner that is contrary to Directive 2006/114/EC” in its list of uses of a sign that may 
infringe a trade mark: the 2015 Directive, art. 10(3).  
141 Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 [63]. 
142 Article 4 of the MCAD lists the conditions, which include: “(d) it does not discredit or denigrate the trade 
marks, trade names, other distinguishing marks, goods, services, activities or circumstances of a competitor … (f) it 
does not take unfair advantage of the reputation of a trade mark, trade name, or other distinguishing marks of a 
competitor or of the designation of origin of competing products; and (g) it does not present goods or services as 
imitations or replicas of goods or services bearing a protected trade mark or trade name”. 
143 Directive, art. 6(1); 2015 Directive, art. 14(1) & (2); 1994 Act, s. 11(2) and (3). See, for example, Bravado 
Merchandising Services v Mainstream Publishing [1996] FSR 205 (CSOH). 
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sign in accordance with “honest practices in industrial or commercial matters”, which the 
CJEU has characterised as expressing “a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate 
interests of the trade mark owner”.144 A third party may violate this condition not only where 
its advertisement creates a false impression of an economic connection, but also in other 
circumstances that may affect the trade mark’s power to attract demand.145 Here as well, the 
CJEU has been willing to extend the owner’s control to protect the image and associations 
that a brand may acquire as well as its exclusivity and in the case of luxury branded products 
to treat this as contributing to their overall quality.146 
When a third party uses a sign similar to a trade mark to refer to a brand in 
comparative or other advertising or when a third party is promoting products that are not of 
the same kind as any for which the trade mark is registered, the owner must rely on the 
second or third grounds of infringement.147 If the owner can establish the requirements for 
one of these grounds, the third party is ipso facto unlikely to be able to satisfy the 
conditions of a defence so that the owner enjoys extensive control over referential use in 
these circumstances as well. The third ground can help to protect a trade mark’s value as a 
communication device more generally where it is both distinctive and familiar to 
consumers. As noted above, this ground can enable the owner to prevent the use of signs 
that would damage or unfairly exploit a trade mark’s prominence in the minds of 
consumers, its ability to prompt immediate recognition and its attractive power in a wide 
range of contexts. This further reinforces the value of brands as marketing resources that 
their owners can exploit across a wide range of consumer-facing markets. 
 
4.2.2 Control over Third Party Responses to Consumers’ Referential Use 
of a Trade Mark 
A trade mark that signifies verbally also gives consumers a reference point that they can use in 
searches, requests and enquiries. For it to be effective at this role, third parties selling or 
supplying products of the relevant kind must respect this meaning in their responses. This 
ensures that specific demand is properly directed to branded products and that the owner 
derives full benefit from the brand’s power to attract specific demand.148 It also helps to 
                                                          
144 Case C-63/97 BMW v Deenik [1999] ECR I-905 [61]; Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen v Putsch [2004] 
ECR I-691 [24]; Case C-228/03 Gillette v LA-Laboratories [2005] ECR I-2337 [41]. 
145 The third party’s use will violate the condition if “it affects the value of the trade mark by taking unfair 
advantage of its distinctive character or repute” or “it entails the discrediting or denigration of that mark” or 
“where the third party presents its product as an imitation or replica of the trade mark bearing the trade mark of 
which it is not the owner”: Case C-228/03 Gillette v LA-Laboratories [2005] ETMR 825 [49]. 
146 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997] ECR I-6013 [45]; Case C-59/08 Copad v Christian 
Dior Couture [2009] ECR I-3421 [24]-[26]. 
147 Case C-533/06 O2 Holdings v Hutchison 3G [2008] ECR I-4231. 
148 Evershed J said that “a great hardship and a great injustice” might be done if trade mark owners could not 
require third party intermediaries to respect the specific meaning of their trade marks since the owners “would 
have, ultimately, no means whatever of securing any sale for their products”: Sales Affiliates v Le Jean [1947] 
Ch 295 (HC) at 299. 
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prevent the trade mark from becoming a generic term for products of the relevant kind.149 
Trade mark law treats a third party’s response to a request or enquiry in which a trade 
mark features as including an implicit representation to the consumer in which the trade 
mark also features.150 A third party who responds to such a request or enquiry by selling or 
supplying a product that is not a branded product without any clarification or explanation 
thereby infringes the trade mark.151 Subject to this, a third party is free to clarify a 
consumer’s actual intention or to alert consumers to alternatives to branded products and 
to seek to persuade them to switch their demand.152 The qualified freedom that this gives 
third parties provides some mitigation of the market power that a firm may enjoy when its 
brand has become a familiar and salient presence in consumers’ minds and consumers are 
liable to use a trade mark signifying it as a convenient reference point without necessarily 
requiring that brand. Nevertheless, this salience may still give an established brand a 
significant advantage over less familiar competitors.153 
The CJEU has adopted a similar approach to regulating third parties’ use of trade 
marks and similar signs for keyword advertising and for determining the extent of brand 
owners’ control over such use.154 Thus, third parties can arrange with internet service 
providers (“ISP”) for the use of certain words and word combinations in on-line searches to 
trigger advertisements or sponsored links for products that the third parties are selling, 
supplying or marketing.155 Again, it is potential consumers who initiate the use of the 
relevant signs, but here third parties have prearranged automated responses with the 
intention that consumers should notice and investigate them.156 In this way, trade marks or 
similar signs form part of the overall communication that may occur between a third party 
and an on-line consumer with the third party’s prearranged response involving an implicit 
                                                          
149 The Directive provides that a trade mark shall be liable to revocation if “in consequence of acts or inactivity 
of the proprietor, it has become the common name in the trade for a product or service in which it is registered”: 
Directive, art. 12(2)(a); 2015 Directive, art. 20(a); 1994 Act, s. 46(1)(c). The CJEU has ruled that this applies 
where both sellers of the product in question and end-users perceive the sign as a name or indicator of the generic 
product rather than signifying a specific brand: Case C-371/02 Björnekulla v Procordia [2004] ECR I-5971; Case C-
409/12 Backaldrin Östereich [2014] Bus LR 320. 
150 The courts have also done this where a sign has acquired origin-specific meaning as a trade mark through use 
and the owner is relying on the tort of passing off: Havana Cigar v Oddenino [1922] 2 Ch 243 (HC) at 251; 
[1923] 1 Ch 179 (CA) at 194 and 202. 
151 Havana Cigar v Oddenino [1923] 1 Ch 179 (CA); Sales Affiliates v Le Jean [1947] Ch 295 (HC); Premier 
Luggage & Bags v Premier Company [2002] EWCA Civ 387; [2003] FSR 69. 
152 Havana Cigar v Oddenino [1922] 2 Ch 243 (HC) at 251; [1923] 1 Ch 179 (CA) at 194-195 and 202. In this 
case, the courts awarded an injunction against the third party imposing an obligation along these lines. 
153 See, for example, the advantage that Coca-Cola enjoys through its ownership of the trade mark “Coke”: 
“Mixing with Coke Over Trademarks is Always a Fizzle: Coca-Cola Adds a Little Life in Court to Those 
Failing to Serve the Real Thing”, Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1978 at 4, noted in R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law 
& Economics (5th ed.) (Pearson Education, 2008) at 142.  
154 Case C-236/08-238/08) Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417; Case C-278/08 Die BergSpechte 
v Günter Guni [2010] ECR I-2517; Case C-558/08 Portakabin v Primakabin [2010] ECR I-6963; Case C-
323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440. 
155 S. Bechtold and C. Tucker, “Trademarks, Triggers and Online Search”, (2014) 11 Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies 718-750. 
156 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 [67]-[68]. 
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representation to the consumer in which the sign features.157 The CJEU has held that 
where a third party uses a trade mark as a keyword and is marketing products of a kind for 
which it is registered, the third party infringes the trade mark under the first ground if its 
advertising is not clear enough to enable a significant proportion of on-line consumers to 
ascertain without difficulty that its products are not branded products and do not have the 
same or an economically-linked commercial origin.158 Even through the advertisement may not 
suggest that this is the case, the third party still infringes under the first ground if it is 
sufficiently vague about the commercial origin of the advertised products that on-line 
consumers are unable to determine this.159 The owner may also be able to use the first ground 
in these circumstances to protect other aspects of the brand’s power to attract demand such 
as an image that exerts emotional appeal.160 Subject to this, a third party is free to seek to 
shift demand away from branded products.161 Where a third party uses a similar sign as a 
keyword or where it is marketing products that are of a different kind from those for which the 
trade mark is registered, the extent of the owner’s control will depend on the other two 
grounds of infringement and be qualified by the need to satisfy the conditions of those 
grounds. 
 
5.  Brands as Resources for Controlling the Supply 
of Branded Products 
As well as providing their owners with an exclusive means of branding products and turning 
them into the potential objects of specific demand, trade marks give their owners exclusive 
control over the supply of branded products that can legitimately satisfy that demand. The 
owner’s exclusive control over supply and the discretion that it has as to how it organises that 
supply are together the basis of the role of brands in business organisation and organisational 
innovation. They are also the basis of the two areas of discretionary power that can increase 
the overall corporate power that the owner enjoys. 
A trade mark signifies that it is under the control of one firm (or greater undertaking)162 
and that this firm has authorised the marketing of the specific products that the trade mark 
                                                          
157 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 [72], citing Case C-17/06 Céline v 
Céline [2007] ECR I-7401 at [23].  
158 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 [83]-[84]; Case C-558/08 
Portakabin v Primakabin [2010] ECR I-6963 [34]; Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 
1440 [44].  
159 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 [89]-[90]; Case C-558/08 
Portakabin v Primakabin [2010] ECR I-6963 [35]; Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 
1440 [45]. 
160 Cosmetic Warriors v Amazon [2014] EWHC 181 (Ch); [2014] FSR 710. 
161 Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 [64. 
162 On the meaning of “one undertaking” in this context, see n. 1. 
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designates as branded products.163 It is the owner’s due authorisation of them as branded 
products that distinguishes these products from all other products of the same kind, including 
products made to exactly the same specification and which are exactly the same as branded 
products in every respect apart from their lack of due authorisation.164 The owner’s exclusive 
right to authorise products as branded products gives it the exclusive right to determine which 
products of the relevant kind can be marketed and treated as branded products and secures 
the owner’s exclusive control over their supply.165 It also ensures that branding products 
amounts to the additional of a valuable intangible input that only a brand owner can supply. 
The owner’s discretion as to how it arranges the production or procurement of the products 
that it brands enables the management of this input to be separated from production within a 
value chain and organised according to its own economies of scale and scope.  
It has already been noted how, in early industrialised economies, the ability of 
manufacturing firms in consumer-facing industries to use branding to engage in marketing 
and attract specific demand was an important factor in their success.166 This was a key 
feature of the archetypal “modern corporation” that could be a major player in national or local 
economies.167 Branding has contributed to a profound shift in the activities of many leading 
consumer-facing firms.    
 
5.1 Exclusive Control over Supply 
A trade mark signifies not only that branded products have a specific commercial 
origin, but also that its owner is in a position to control and vouch for their quality and other 
characteristics. 168 A brand may therefore differentiate products on this basis as well.169 The 
owner’s control over supply enables it to control the track record of the branded products, 
                                                          
163 Major Bros. v Franklin [1908] 1 KB 712 (HC); Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38]-
[39]. 
164 “[I]t is not enough that they should have been manufactured to Primark’s specification: they must have been 
adopted by Primark as its goods. Without such adoption, Primark cannot be taken to be saying either that it is 
the source of the goods or that it accepts responsibility for their quality”: Primark v Lollypop Clothing [2001] 
FSR 637 (HC) [11] (Mr John Martin QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge).  
165 Case C-102/77 Hoffmann-la Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 [7]; Case C-10/89 Cnl Sucal v Hag 
[1990] ECR I-3711 [13]; Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38]-[39]. 
166 See n. 67. 
167 M. Wilkins, n. 4. On the demise of “national champions” of this kind, see also J. Froud et al, n. 8. 
168 The owner’s position of ongoing control over the supply of branded products is usually a corollary of its 
exclusive right to authorise products as branded products, but occasionally it has to be addressed separately. In a 
case concerning the free movement of branded goods within the European Union, the CJEU had to decide when 
two firms operating in different member states and supplying products of the same kind under the same trade 
mark should be treated as constituting one undertaking and their respective branded products treated as having 
the same commercial origin. It ruled that whether or not they do so depends on whether or not they are 
connected in such a way as to establish a single point of ongoing control over the condition and quality of their 
respective products: Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38]-[39]. See also Aristoc v Rysta 
[1945] AC 68 (HL) at 101-102. 
169 Andrew (John) v Kuehnrich (1913) 30 RPC 677(CA). See T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, n.4, at 655. 
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which underlies the brand’s reputation and is a major factor in its power to attract specific 
demand. It enables the owner to ensure that branded products are consistent with each other 
and, if it so desires, consistent to a degree and with characteristics that only unitary control 
over their production can achieve.170 The owner’s control over supply therefore underpins the 
trade mark’s value as a basis for communication about branded products.171 This control is 
secured by the owner’s right to prohibit the use of a trade mark signifying the brand for 
identifying or marketing products of the relevant kind that it has not authorised as branded 
products on the basis that this amounts to infringement of the trade mark.172 It may 
sometimes be necessary to inquire into the circumstances concerning the marketing of certain 
products to ascertain whether or not the owner has authorised or adopted them as branded 
products and accepted commercial responsibility for them accordingly.173 It is also possible for 
the owner to exercise its exclusive right through a licensing agreement.174 With licensing, the 
owner has the necessary position of ongoing control over the supply of branded products 
through its ability to police and enforce those terms of the licensing agreement that concern 
the quality and other characteristics of the products that the licensee is authorised to supply 
as branded products, with the Directive providing that breach of any such term can negate the 
owner’s authorisation and render the products illegitimate.175 
The owner’s control over supply gives it the opportunity to earn a return from the 
brand’s power to attract demand on every occasion when branded products are first placed on 
the market with the benefit of this power.176 This ensures that the owner has an economic 
interest in every product that can affect the track record of the brand as well as having control 
over that track record. It is this alignment of interest and control that puts economic force 
behind the “guarantee” that a brand and its trade mark signifiers is said to give consumers 
concerning the quality and other characteristics of branded products. The owner’s control over 
supply also gives it discretion to vary the quality and other characteristics of the branded 
products, which is the main shortcoming of that guarantee. However, Whilst this discretion 
presents an obvious risk of disappointment to consumers, it has significant positive 
                                                          
170 See above at n. 50. 
171 Case C-10/89 Cnl Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR I-3711 [13]; Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-
2789 [38]-[39]. 
172 Major Bros. v Franklin [1908] 1 KB 712 (HC); Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38]-
[39]. 
173 Primark v Lollypop Clothing [2001] FSR 637 (HC) at [11]. 
174 Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38]-[39]. 
175 Directive, art. 8; 2015 Directive, art. 25(2). The article states that the owner may invoke “the rights conferred 
by that trade mark against a licensee who contravenes any provision in his licensing contract with regard to … 
“(c) the scope of the goods or services for which the licence is granted … or (e) the quality of the goods 
manufactured or of the services provided by the licensee”. The CJEU has ruled that this provision can cover 
intangible product quality and that in some circumstances the owner can prohibit marketing (as branded 
products) after breach of a term in the licence that relates to a particular image or set of associations for the trade 
mark such as restrictions on the kind of distribution outlets through which marked products can be sold or on 
certain forms of advertising: Case C-59/08 Copad v Christian Dior Couture [2009] ECR I-3421 [22]-[24]; [27]-
[37]. See Advocate General Kokott’s discussion of this point in her Opinion to the CJEU at [AG30]-[AG37]. 
176 Case C-46/10 Viking Gas v Kosan Gas [2011] ETMR 58 (WL) [31]-[32]. 
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implications. It gives the owner scope to engage in product development and other forms of 
innovation, with the trade mark’s reputation mitigating some of the risks that innovation 
presents to consumers. As section 3 has shown, this discretionary power is an important 
aspect of the contribution that brands can make to corporate power. 
An important supply-side feature of European trade mark law is that a brand owner’s 
exclusive right to authorise the first marketing of branded products has a territorial 
dimension. This applies where the branded products are goods and can therefore be sold on or 
further marketed in some other way. The owner has the right to authorise the first marketing 
of branded goods within the European Economic Area (“EEA”) even for goods that it has 
already authorised for marketing as branded goods outside the EEA.177 This territorial 
dimension is achieved through a combination of the rule that the owner’s supply-side rights 
are “exhausted” for goods once it has authorised them as branded products and the strict 
limitation of this rule to the boundaries of the single market. The exhaustion rule, which gives 
effect to the principle of the free movement of goods,178 is designed to combat the territorial 
partitioning of markets for branded goods within the EEA and to promote “intra-brand” or 
“downstream” competition.179 It therefore sets limits on an owner’s rights to prohibit third 
parties from using a trade mark signifying its brand as a product identifier for the further 
marketing of branded products within the EEA and as a means of advertising and promoting 
the further marketing of such products and from using these products to satisfy demand for 
branded products.180  
The exhaustion of their supply-side control after first marketing in the EEA is a 
significant limitation on the scope that firms have to use their brands to gain and exploit 
excessive market power through promoting downstream and inhibiting territorial price 
discrimination within the EEA. On the other hand, the limitation of this to first marketing in 
the EEA means that brand owners can insulate themselves from downstream competition at 
the international level, which gives them scope to engage in territorial price discrimination at 
                                                          
177 Case C-355/96 Silhouette v Hartlauer [1998] ECR I-4799; Case C-173/98 Sebago v GB-Unic [1999] ECR I-
4103; Joined Cases C-414/99-C-416/99 Zino Davidoff v A & G Imports [2001] ECR I-8691. See further A.G. 
Chronopoulos and S.M. Maniatis, “Trademark Exhaustion and its Interface with EU Competition Law”, in I. 
Calboli and E. Lee (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Exhaustion and Parallel Imports 
(Edward Elgar, 2016) at 343-366. 
178 Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (or “TFEU”) prohibits any legal 
restrictions on the movement of goods between member states for further marketing unless the restrictions can 
be justified on grounds of the protection of “industrial and commercial property”. 
179  On the goal of promoting downstream competition, see Case C-46/10 Viking Gas v Kosan Gas (C-46/10) 
[2011] ETMR 58 (WL) [34]-[35]. Price discrimination occurs when a firm is able to charge different prices for 
the same or very similar products to different consumers or groups of consumers: see, for example, R. Van den 
Bergh and P. Camasasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2006) at 254-257.  On territorial price discrimination in this context, see K.E. Maskus, “Economic 
Perspectives on Exhaustion and Parallel Imports”, in I. Calboli and E. Lee (eds), Research Handbook on 
Intellectual Property Exhaustion and Parallel Imports (Edward Elgar, 2016) 106-124 at 112-113. See further R. 
Schmalensee, “Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination”, (1981) 71 
American Economic Review 242-247. 
180 Directive, art. 7; 2015 Directive, art. 15; 1994 Act, s. 12. 
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that level.181 If the United Kingdom leaves the EEA at the same time as it leaves the European 
Union, which seems likely at the time of writing, then it will be able to restrict this through 
adopting a rule of international exhaustion. 
Even in the case of the further marketing of branded goods within the EEA, owners 
retain some continuing control over the use of their trade marks by third parties such as 
parallel importers. This in effect gives them some continuing control over the products that 
can legitimately satisfy specific demand for branded products, which is necessary to ensure 
that owners can continue to vouch for branded products and prevent the kind of interference 
with them that could undermine their ability to do so 182   The CJEU has limited the owner’s 
continuing control in such cases by treating the owner’s rights as exhausted despite 
unauthorised interference where a third party can show that certain conditions are 
satisfied.183 The owner’s control is then limited to policing and enforcing these conditions 
and is secured through an overriding condition that requires a third party to give the owner 
prior notice in writing.184 Prior notification gives the owner the opportunity to verify and if 
necessary enforce a third party’s compliance with the other conditions, which are designed 
to protect the brand’s attractive power.185 The CJEU has taken a broad view of what may 
contribute to this attractive power and recognised that it may reflect a prestigious image 
that confers an intangible form of quality on the branded products.186  
 
5.2 Discretion over the Organisation of Supply 
Whilst trade mark law requires a brand owner to be in a position of ongoing control over the 
products that it authorises as branded products, it does not prescribe or limit the basis on 
which the owner may have this control.187 This allows for a wide range of organisational 
                                                          
181 On the “national”, “regional” and “international” variants of rules of exhaustion in this context,  see K.E. 
Maskus, “Parallel Imports”, (2000) 23 World Economy 1269-1284 at 1270; K. Saggi, “Regional Exhaustion of 
Intellectual Property”, (2014) 10 International Journal of Economic Theory 125-137 at 125-126; K.E. Maskus 
(2016), n. 179, at 106-107. 
182 The Directive, art. 7; 2015 Directive, art. 15. The CJEU has ruled that the circumstances in which this is the 
case are not limited to activity that may affect the functional or material quality of the marked products: Case C-
46/10 Viking Gas v Kosan Gas (C-46/10) [2011] ETMR 58 (WL)[ 36]. 
183 Case C-427/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v Paranova  [1996] ECR I-3457; Case C-348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim 
v Swingward (No. 2) [2007] ECR-3391; Case C-276/05  Wellcome v Paranova [2008] ECR I-10479; Cases C-
400/09 & C-207/10 Orifarm v Merck [2011] CMLR 10 (WL). Similar conditions apply where the third party 
needs to rebrand goods for further marketing in a different territory within the EEA: Case C-379/97 Pharmacia 
& Upjohn v Paranova [1999] ECR I-6927. 
184 The CJEU has ruled that failure to give this notice renders the goods “spurious” and equivalent to 
unauthorised products: Case C-348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim v Swingward (No. 2) [2007] ECR-3391 [64]. 
185 Case C-102/77 Hoffmann-la Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 [11]; Cases C-400/09 & C-207/10 
Orifarm v Merck [2011] CMLR 10 (WL) [26]. 
186 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997] ECR I-6013; Case C-59/08 Copad v Christian Dior 
Couture  [2009] ECR I-3421; Case C-46/10 Viking Gas v Kosan Gas (C-46/10) [2011] ETMR 58 (WL). 
187 The commercial origin that a trade mark guarantees “is not defined by reference to the manufacturer but by 
reference to the point of control of manufacture”: Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [37]. 
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possibilities.  The owner can, for example, make use of contractual mechanisms such as 
sub-contracting and licensing.188 This supply-side flexibility has ensured that firms at 
various stages along a value chain can use trade marks to brand their products and attract 
specific demand, thereby increasing their bargaining power within the chain.  It also gives 
firms greater scope to reorganise their production arrangements by outsourcing some or all 
of this activity.189 This has enabled the organisation and orchestration of production to 
develop as a distinct form of economic activity with its own set of capabilities.  
Brands have therefore enabled firms to develop and exploit lucrative marketing 
platforms based on their effectiveness and success at attracting specific demand. Changes 
in media and communication have enabled many products to be marketed on a much wider or 
even global scale. This has increased the scope for achieving economies of scale and scope at 
the level of output and marketing, but also the likely divergence from the economies of 
production. This increases the potential benefits of disaggregating and outsourcing production. 
As noted above, many consumer-facing firms have adopted business models that involve 
focusing their resources and capabilities on higher-value activities such as product 
development, design and marketing whilst orchestrating production from supply chains.190 
Changes in technology and communication, especially digitalisation, have increased the 
efficiency of smaller scale production, enabling much greater flexibility in production 
arrangements and facilitating more rapid product development.191 In conjunction with these 
changes, the ability of firms to brand products through trade marks has enabled them to 
respond to and take advantage of innovation more rapidly and has increased the scope they 
have to market customised products and to upgrade them rapidly to meet consumer 
demand for greater variety and differentiation. As a basis for communication about branded 
products, trade marks also facilitate the kind of feedback between consumers and 
producers that can help firms to compete more effectively in these conditions.192 Whilst 
brand owners need to have sufficient control over production to protect the track records 
and attractive power of their brands, changes in technology and communication have made 
it easier to do this indirectly through contractual mechanisms.  
The ability to engage in marketing to attract specific demand to distinctive product 
identities under their exclusive control, to shape and orchestrate this demand and to 
outsource the production of the relevant supply into supply chains has enabled firms to 
reduce their costs, increase their profits and given them strategic power. This has shifted 
                                                          
188 Major Bros. v Franklin [1908] 1 KB 712 (HC); Primark v Lollypop Clothing [2001] FSR 637 (HC); Case C-
9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 [38]-[39]. 
189 Bostitch TM [1963] RPC 183 (HC). 
190 This trend lay behind the practices and conditions that Naomi Klein addressed in her millennial bestseller: N. 
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the balance of power in the global economy away from firms engaged in production in many 
industries.193 Where upstream firms are not well placed to market their products directly to 
consumers and attract specific demand, they are more vulnerable to the bargaining power 
of downstream marketing and retail firms that are well-placed to do so.194 Here, the effect of 
branding is to intensify competition within supply chains in terms of price, reliability and 
speed of production, but not necessarily for the benefit of consumers who are dependent on 
the effectiveness of competition further downstream at the marketing and retail stages and 
who in any event may face substantial switching costs.195  Greater reliance on outsourcing 
raises other concerns. Competitive pressures within supply chains, with firms engaged in 
production having to compete on cost minimisation and their ability and willingness to meet 
tight deadlines, are not conducive to ensuring high standards of working conditions and good 
business behaviour.196  
Outsourcing also gives firms greater scope to avoid direct responsibility for ensuring 
compliance with regulation applying to working conditions, environmental protection and 
other aspects of production. Responsibility for working conditions and business behaviour in 
supply chains has been a major concern in attempts to ensure minimum global standards 
such as the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.197 The 
commercial accountability that brands facilitate should in principle cover conditions and 
standards within supply chains since these form part of the overall commercial provenance of 
branded products and, as with the material quality of inputs, they are something that brand 
owners could control and vouch for if they had enough incentive to do so.198 This would 
provide some mitigation of the negative impact of branding in this respect.199 Organisational 
reputation can be a factor in the appeal of brands to consumers, with their trade mark 
signifiers providing salient focal points for any bad publicity concerning standards and 
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behaviour in their supply chains and for their owners’ efforts at countering that bad 
publicity.200 Nevertheless, the strength of this incentive in practice and therefore its mitigating 
effect depends on a number of variable factors, not least the willingness of consumers to give 
weight to business standards and behaviour in their decision-making and the prices that they 
are willing to pay. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article has linked trade marks and the brands that they signify to two forms of power that 
large firms possess, namely market power and discretionary power. In Corporate Power and 
Responsibility, John Parkinson saw both these forms as contributing to the overall social 
decision-making power of large firms and as justifying efforts to require them to act in the 
public interest. This article has argued that the ability of firms to use trade marks to brand 
products, engage in marketing and build up goodwill as a distinct intangible resource 
increases their potential to gain and exercise both forms of power. 
The study of Apple noted in this article has shown the strategic value to a large firm of 
having a strong marketing presence along with a resource that enables it to attract demand 
from consumers to a range of products including ones that are new or rapidly upgraded. The 
flexibility of a brand as a marketing resource helps to explain the extent of the discretionary 
power that some large firms enjoy over the opportunities available to consumers. Firms with 
market power also have discretionary power over the production or procurement of the 
products that they put on the market and therefore over the opportunities of firms and 
personnel involved in this activity and over other parties who may be affected by it. In 
particular, the article has shown how brands facilitate the separation of marketing from 
production in consumer-facing industries and enabled each of these activities to evolve 
according to its own economic logic. This has increased the scope that large firms have to 
focus on marketing along with other higher value activities and to outsource production into 
global supply chains. Apple, for example, has outsourced much of its production into a trans-
Pacific supply chain and its market power has given it significant bargaining power within this 
chain. This article has also noted the importance of this scope for outsourcing to the “fast 
fashion” business model in the garment industry and how it led to the transformation of 
Clarks shoes into a global marketing firm. 
The ability of firms to establish brands and use them as a resource in the development 
and deployment of their activities and capabilities has implications for analysing and 
understanding corporate power and for efforts at regulating it for the benefit of those whose 
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lives and interests are affected by it. This ability can make large firms much more protean and 
elusive and therefore much harder to regulate effectively. It has expanded the range of parties 
who may be affected by the activities of large firms, but has also reduced the direct 
responsibility of large firms for these parties. It has helped to weaken the ties that many large 
firms once had to particular places and communities and to increase their tendency to become 
financially-driven. Brands have done much to shape the nature, direction and organisation of 
economic activity in the globalised world, the balance of power among business actors and the 
overall structure of opportunities in that world. These are all matters that efforts to require 
large firms to act in the public interest need to take into account.  
 
 
